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Abstract  
Purpose – Communication of risk management practices are a critical component of good 
corporate governance.  Research to date has been of little benefit in informing regulators 
internationally.  This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by investigating how listed 
Australian companies in a setting where disclosures are explicitly required by the ASX 
corporate governance framework, disclose risk management (RM) information in the 
corporate governance statements within annual reports.  
 
Design/methodology/approach –To address our study’s research questions and related 
hypotheses, we examine the top 300 ASX-listed companies by market capitalisation at 30 
June 2010. For these firms, we identify, code and categorise RM disclosures made in the 
annual reports according to the disclosure categories specified in Australian Stock Exchange 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (ASX CGPR). The derived data is 
then examined using a comprehensive approach comprising thematic content analysis and 
regression analysis. 
 
Findings – The results indicate widespread divergence in disclosure practices and low 
conformance with the Principle 7 of the ASX CGPR. This result suggests that companies are 
not disclosing all ‘material business risks’ possibly due to ignorance at the board level, or due 
to the intentional withholding of sensitive information from financial statement users. The 
findings also show mixed results across the factors expected to influence disclosure 
behaviour. Notably, the presence of a risk committee (RC) (in particular, a standalone RC) 
and technology committee (TC) are found to be associated with improved levels of 
disclosure. we do not find evidence that company risk measures (as proxied by equity beta 
and the market-to-book ratio) are significantly associated with greater levels of RM 
disclosure. Also, contrary to common findings in the disclosure literature, factors such as 
board independence and expertise, audit committee independence, and the usage of a Big-4 
auditor do not seem to impact the level of RM disclosure in the Australian context.   
 
Research limitation/implications  –  The study is limited by the sample and study period 
selection as the RM disclosures of only the largest (top 300) ASX firms are examined for the 
fiscal year 2010. Thus, the finding may not be generalisable to smaller firms, or earlier/later 
years.  Also, the findings may have limited applicability in other jurisdictions with different 
regulatory environments. 
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Practical implications –The study’s findings suggest that insufficient attention has been 
applied to RM disclosures by listed companies in Australia. These results suggest that the 
RM disclosures practices observed in the Australian setting may not be meeting the 
objectives of regulators and the needs of stakeholders.  
 
Originality/value – Despite the importance of risk management communication, it is unclear 
whether disclosures in annual financial reports achieve this communication.  The Australian 
setting provides an ideal environment to examine the nature and extent of risk management 
communication as the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) has recommended risk 
management disclosures follow Principle 7 of its principle-based governance rules since 
2007.  
 
Keywords: Risk Management disclosure, corporate governance, agency theory, mixed 
method research 
 
Article Classification: Research paper 
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An Analysis of Risk Management Disclosures: Australian Evidence 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the last decade, large corporate collapses and the global financial crisis have caused 
widespread instability and concern in the world’s major financial markets. Prominent among 
the concerns have been criticisms of inaccurate or inadequate corporate disclosures about 
governance practices, particularly those relating to risk management (RM) activities.  These 
disclosure shortcomings are claimed to impact on investor’s ability to fully assess public 
companies and their associated risks (Mokhtar and Mellett, 2013; Abraham & Shrives, 2014). 
Although there is general consensus on the need for effective risk management (RM) 
disclosure there is less agreement on how and to what extent RM practices should be 
communicated. While prior research across various jurisdictions has identified weaknesses 
and limitations in risk reporting in various jurisdictions, most of this research has focused on 
the usefulness of general risk narratives reported in various sections of annual reports, less 
attention has focused on the effectiveness on alternative approaches to risk management 
reporting. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to contribute to the understanding of an 
alternative regime by examining of the effectiveness of the Australian Securities Exchange 
(ASX) RM disclosure framework.  
 
The Australian setting is of interest because corporate governance disclosures by ASX-
listed companies are required to conform with the “if not, why not” approach in relation the 
ASX’s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (ASX CGPR) [1].  Principle 7 
of the ASX CGPR “Recognise and Manage Risk” is the primary guidance applicable to 
companies for RM disclosures. This principle requires that ‘companies should establish a 
sound system of risk oversight and management and internal control’ (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2007, p. 33). Companies are required to determine the ‘material 
business risks’ they encounter and develop a set of policies to account for these risks while 
presenting a summary of this policy to external parties (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
2007).  However, the ASX’s Principle 7 goes further than RM disclosure regimes prescribed 
in other countries. Augmenting the principle-based approach, Principle 7 provides guidelines 
which categorise risk management areas that the ASX expects listed firms to comment on in 
their annual report disclosures. Thus, in contrast to previous research we are able to 
specifically examine RM disclosures against a benchmark thereby shedding light on how 
managers exercise their disclosure discretion in relation to specific areas of risk management. 
It has been claimed that in a principle-based regulatory environment, companies display a 
discretionary or a “self-regulation” approach by voluntarily disclosing more information than 
required and the information is more transparent on how the company is governed 
(Bauwhede and Willekens, 2008; Taylor and Zhang, 2011; Abraham & Shrives, 2014). 
However, the extent and quality of such discretionary disclosure remains an empirical issue 
in a setting where specific guidelines are provided that may alter the level of managerial 
discretion.   
 
Thus, motivated by the paucity of research on alternative frameworks for RM disclosure, 
we seek to contribute to the knowledge about the effectiveness (to the users of annual reports) 
of RM disclosures in a setting where disclosures are explicitly required as a component of the 
corporate governance reporting framework. In investigating the effectiveness of the ASX’s 
regime we identify and compare the nature and extent of corporate RM disclosures in annual 
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reports, and factors that influence the variation in disclosure. In particular, we examine how 
differences in risk factors and corporate governance (including board, risk and technology 
committees) impact on disclosure practices.  Specifically the following research questions are 
addressed:  
 
(RQ1) what is the nature and extent of corporate risk management disclosures provided in 
accordance with the ASX’s CGPR Principle 7, and  
 
(RQ2) what corporate risk and governance factors influence the level of risk management 
disclosures provided in accordance with this principle? 
 
To address our research questions and related hypotheses we use a sample comprising the 
top 300 ASX-listed companies by market capitalisation at 30 June 2010. For these firms, we 
examine the corporate governance statements which forms part of the annual report for fiscal 
year 2010. We then identify, code and categorise RM disclosures according to the major risk 
disclosure categories specified in Principle 7 of the ASX CGPR.  The derived data are then 
examined using a comprehensive approach comprising thematic content analysis and 
regression analyses. 
 
With respect to RQ1, the results indicate widespread divergence in disclosure practices 
and low conformance with Principle 7 of the ASX CGPR. Approximately one-half of the top 
300 ASX listed companies did not disclosure useful information on ‘material business risks’ 
under the thirteen major risk categories identified in the commentary section of 
recommendation 7.1 & 7.4.  Where disclosures are made, our risk category and thematic 
analyses reveals that disclosure frequency and quality is poor with companies less inclined to 
disclose sensitive information such as the failures in technological innovations, threats of 
legal action, and issues associated with environmental responsibilities and the quality of 
products and services. Thus companies appear to be failing to disclose all ‘material business 
risks’ as anticipated in the ASX’s recommendations.  
 
With respect to RQ2, the findings are mixed on the factors expected to influence RM 
disclosure behaviour and vary according to the specific RM disclosure sub-group. Factors 
found to be associated with improved levels of disclosure include: audit committee (AC) 
expertise, the presence of a risk committee (RC) (in particular, a standalone RC), and a 
technology committee. However, contrary to frequent findings in the voluntary disclosure 
literature (e.g. Malone et al. 1993), other common corporate governance proxies (e.g. board 
independence and expertise, audit committee independence, auditor quality) have little 
impact on the level of RM disclosure.  Surprisingly, common corporate risk measures (apart 
from financial leverage) are not associated with increased disclosure levels. This result may 
be due to the selective disclosure finding noted for RQ1. 
 
Overall, the study’s findings suggest that insufficient attention has been applied to RM 
disclosures by listed companies in Australia. As a consequence, the RM disclosures provided 
under the ASX corporate governance framework are unlikely to be representative of the 
underlying risks encountered by listed ASX firms and therefore the disclosures may not be 
meeting the objectives of regulators and the needs of stakeholders.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of 
relevant RM disclosure literature. The study’s theoretical arguments and hypotheses are 
developed in Section 3. The comprehensive research design used to address the research 
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questions and test the hypotheses are outlined in Section 4 and the results from applying this 
design are presented in Section 5. The paper concludes with as summary and discussion of 
findings in Section 6.  
 
Literature Review 
Prior research on risk disclosure over the last two decades has predominantly examined the 
nature and extent of RM disclosures by scrutinising data collected from company annual 
reports, and by using content and statistical analysis techniques to examine the identified risk 
disclosures. Factors that impact on the level of risk disclosures are also often identified. 
 
There has been much discussion internationally about what companies should disclose in 
their annual reports and often in particular the narrative sections of these reports.  The 
seminal work of Beattie et al. (2004) established many of the content analysis processes later 
used to examine risk disclosures and was one of the first studies to focus on developing a 
framework to better understand the nature of the narrative annual report disclosures in order 
to develop a rich descriptive profile of a company’s disclosures. This meaning oriented 
analysis (Smith and Taffler, 2000) recommended that studies analyse and categorise narrative 
annual report disclosures by topic, time orientation, financial/non-financial and 
quantitative/non-quantitative as a way of measuring disclosure quality.  The study applied 
this meaning oriented framework to food and beverage company annual reports and found 
that it was an appropriate way to develop a detailed understanding of a company’s narrative 
disclosures.  
 
At a similar time, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) developed a framework for analysing 
voluntary narrative risk disclosures in the annual reports of 85 non-financial listed Italian 
companies.  Their framework also focused on developing a meaning oriented profile of a 
company’s risk disclosures by categorising by economic sign (direction of expected impact of 
risks), the content of the risk disclosure, whether the disclosures were financial/non-financial, 
quantitative/non-quantitative and what outlook orientation the disclosures indicated.  Beretta 
and Bozzolan (2004) found that risk disclosures are intrinsically narrative and that risk 
disclosure quality is dependent on quantity and richness.  
 
Linsley and Shrives (2005) was one of the first studies to examine voluntary risk 
disclosures in the UK, and similar to Beattie et al., (2004) and Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) 
developed a meaning oriented methodology to examining risk disclosures by categorising 
risk management sentences. The framework outlined by Linsley and Shrives (2005) focused 
on categorising the disclosures into types of risks, whether the disclosures provided monetary 
or non-monetary information, whether the disclosure provided good, bad or neutral news and 
whether the disclosures discussed future or past information.  The study found that 
disclosures were most prevalent in the strategic risk category, that there was a significantly 
higher proportion of future information disclosed, that most of the disclosures were not of a 
monetary nature and that neutral risk disclosures were greater than good or bad news risk 
disclosures. Also in 2005, Lajili and Zeghal (2005) examined the state, nature and volume of 
risk disclosures in Canadian Annual reports where risk disclosures were regulated by the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA).  They also created a profile of risk 
disclosures and found that risk disclosures are exclusively qualitative in nature, are primarily 
located in the management discussion and analysis section or the notes to the accounts and 
found that financial risk, commodity and market risk were the most disclosed risk categories.   
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Risk disclosure research has developed since these seminal papers in three main ways.  
The first group include studies which have continued to undertake research on the quality of 
risk disclosures and have extended the seminal studies described above. The second group of 
studies has moved more towards analysing risk disclosures from the perspective of 
identifying and explaining the reasons why companies disclose risk information in annual 
reports within various jurisdictions. The third group of studies primarily focuses on 
examining and comparing risk disclosures across jurisdictions. 
 
The first group includes a number of studies exploring the work on the quality aspects of 
risk disclosures. Amongst these studies are Beretta and Bozzolan (2008), Othman and Ameer 
(2009), Oliveira et al (20011a; 20011b), Miihkinen (2012) and Ismail et al. (2013).  
(Summary details for these studies cis presented in Appendix 1).  Abraham & Shrives (2014) 
provide a more recent study that extends the literature on risk disclosure quality. For a sample 
of U.K. listed firms, they applied a multi-theoretic and longitudinal approach to examining 
the quality of risk disclosures with the objective of identifying how to improve corporate risk 
reporting. They found that disclosures tend to be general, they change very little and seem to 
bear limited or no relation to actual risks faced by companies.  Despite the increased demand 
for improved risk reporting from professional accounting bodies, useful risk information 
appears to being withheld by companies.  They proposed three questions managers should 
consider to improve their risk reporting processes namely: are there changes in reported risks 
in risk factor statements over time; are significant events identified in prior risk factor 
statements; and are significant risk factor statements discussed in subsequent risk factor 
statements? 
 
The second group of risk disclosure studies focused on examining the reasons why risk 
disclosure levels vary within jurisdictions and include Linsley and Shrives (2006), Linsley 
and Lawrence (2007) and Abraham and Cox (2007) who examined voluntary risk disclosures 
in the UK and Canada in the period 2001-2002 (prior to mandatory requirements).  These 
authors continued to use the seminal work described above to develop a profile of risk 
disclosures using sentences as the unit of analysis, but extended the literature in this area to 
focus more on statistical testing disclosure determinants such as company size, environmental 
risk, board of directors, institutional investors, dual-listed stock influenced the level of 
voluntary risk disclosures by U.K. companies. Linsley and Shrives (2006) found a positive 
association between company size and environmental risk, while Abraham & Cox (2007) 
found a negative relationship between the level of risk disclosures and share ownership by 
long term institutions, but found that the number of executives and number of independent 
board directors are positively related to the level of corporate risk reporting.  Linsley & 
Lawrence (2007) examined the readability of risk disclosures and found the readability 
difficult or very difficult and that directors do not deliberately stop the disclosure of less 
favourable risk news. 
 
This early work motivated Amran et al. (2009) to undertake similar work in Malaysia 
where there were greater regulatory requirements for risk reporting.  This study focused on 
analysing the narrative section of company annual reports.  They found that risk disclosure 
levels in Malaysian annual reports contain much less information than in the U.K. despite 
regulatory requirements. Additionally, they found that company size was significantly 
associated with the level of risk disclosures, but leverage was not significantly associated 
with the level of risk disclosures.  A number of other studies from 2009 to 2014 have focused 
on explaining different aspects of risk disclosures within a single country for example 
Elzahar and Hussainey (2012), Elshandidy et al. (2013) and Al-Najjar and Abed (2014) 
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(UK); Amran et al. (2009) and Ismail and Rahman (2011) (Malaysia); Probohudono et al. 
(2013) (South East Asia);  Hassan (2009) (UAE); Mokhtar and Mellett (2013) (Egypt); 
Hemrit and Arab (2011) (Tunisia); Sekome and Lemma (2014) (South Africa).  The detailed 
results of these studies (provided in Appendix 1) show that levels of risk disclosure are 
positively related to company size, board size, board independence, the independence of the 
audit committee and block-holder ownership.  
 
The third group of studies examined risk disclosures across a number of jurisdictions 
simultaneously.  For example, Dobler et al. (2011) compared risk disclosures between the 
U.S., Canada, U.K. and Germany companies based on disclosures contained in all sections of 
the annual reports. The study did not distinguish between mandatory and voluntary risk 
disclosures. The study noted that these countries require risk disclosures in both the notes and 
supplementary management reports of the annual report.  The study found a prevalence of 
risk disclosures located in the management report which were qualitative in nature and 
predominantly past, present and non-time specific in nature.  Risk disclosures were found to 
be of a similar quantity across countries and the regression results revealed a size effect and 
evidence that risk disclosure quantity is associated with proxies for the level of firm risk.   
 
Similar cross jurisdictional risk disclosure studies were undertaken by Elshandidy and 
Neri (2014) using U.K. and Italian companies, and Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey (2014) 
between German, U.K. and U.S. companies. Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey (2014) found 
significant variations in mandatory and voluntary risk disclosures within and between firms 
across the three countries, while Elshandidy and Neri (2014) found that governance factors 
principally influenced the decisions of companies in the U.K. to exhibit higher levels of 
voluntary rather than mandatory risk disclosures whereis in Italy corporate governance 
motivates companies to provide more mandatory risk disclosures than voluntary disclosures.   
 
 In comparison with the number of U.S. and UK studies, there have been few Australian 
studies that have examined risk disclosures despite a specific requirement since 2007 that 
Australian listed companies are required to provide risk disclosures as part of a broader 
corporate governance disclosure framework (the ASX CGPR) – a framework (with disclosure 
guidelines) which differs from other countries studied above.  Two notable studies are by 
Taylor et al. (2010) and Taylor & Zhang (2011). Taylor et al. (2010) analysed financial risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of 111 listed resource companies by analysing financial risk 
disclosures and developing a financial risk disclosure index.  The study found that corporate 
governance and capital raisings of these listed resource companies are significantly and 
positively related to financial risk management disclosures in Australia.  Taylor & Zhang 
(2011) undertook a broader study and analysed the annual reports of sixty-six of the top 201-
top 350 listed ASX companies and considered the impact of institutional investors and audit 
committees on RM disclosure levels.  The found a negative and weak association between 
long term institutional ownership and the level of RM disclosures and a strong and positive 
association between audit committee independence and RM disclosure levels. While these 
two studies are useful in understanding risk disclosures by certain ASX listed firms, neither 
provides an in depth analysis of the risk management disclosures against the categorical 
framework provided in the ASX’s Principle 7 guidelines (Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
Corporate Governance Council, 2007).  
 
In summary, the literature to date (as documented in Appendix 1), is still evolving with 
regulatory changes but to date, it appears to indicate that current risk reporting internationally 
does not provide investors with helpful and meaningful information.  The first group of 
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international studies while expanding the knowledge on the different aspects of quality found 
within risk disclosures, has done little to impact the quality of risk disclosures currently being 
included in annual reports internationally, the second group of studies while better explaining 
the factors that may influence the level of risk disclosures, have not yet definitely identified 
specific characteristics impacting on risk disclosure levels. The third group of studies have 
indicated that there are differences between different country’s risk disclosures - whether the 
disclosures are voluntary or mandatory and has attempted to provide a broader understanding 
of differences in the current international approaches to risk disclosures. Finally, most 
relevant to our study has been the small number of studies based in Australia which are 
governed by the ASX CGPR (Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance 
Council, 2007). These studies have been limited to either a specific industry or a small 
sample and have not provided an in depth (categorical or thematically) analysis of the risk 
management disclosures.  
 
Thus the literature review has revealed that most risk reporting studies focus on voluntary 
risk disclosures in various sections of annual reports. Few studies have examined risk 
management disclosures prescribed under corporate governance frameworks, and we are 
unable to identify any prior study that has examined risk management disclosure in a 
principle-based governance regime where specific guidelines on disclosure expectations are 
provided by the regulator. Consequently we are motivated to examine such an environment in 
this study.  
 
Theoretical Approach and Hypothesis Development 
Given our focus on risk management disclosure in the context of the ASX’s corporate 
governance reporting framework, agency theory has particular applicability to this study. The 
theory posits that agency costs are incurred by a company as a result of principal/agent 
conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hendry 2002; Dalton et al., 2007). 
To reduce agency costs, principals via the board of directors and related committees 
introduce monitoring and incentives to align the actions of the agent (management) with that 
of the principal (shareholders) (Eisenhardt, 1989; Dalton et al., 2007).  Effective external 
reporting and disclosure by managers facilitates monitoring of managers by stakeholders. 
Additionally, external governance mechanisms in the form of external auditing and 
institutional investor monitoring play an important role in mitigating agency costs. Thus, 
based on agency theory, a number of potentially influential governance factors are likely to 
be associated with the level and quality of RM disclosure. In combination with the quality of 
internal and external governance, we further expect that company characteristics, notably the 
level of risk faced by the firm plays a pivotal role in the nature of corporate RM disclosure. 
These governance and corporate characteristics are considered in developing our research 
hypotheses. 
 
Factors Hypothesised to Influence RM Disclosure  
Board of Directors Characteristics 
 
Prior research on mandatory and discretionary disclosure by publicly listed companies 
provides considerable evidence of the association between board characteristics and the level 
and quality of voluntary disclosures - such as risk management disclosure (Cornier et al., 
2010; Eng and Mak, 2003). Thus, the degree of monitoring by the board appears to have a 
significant impact on the intensity and transparency of disclosures (Fama, 1980).  Principle 1 
of the ASX CGPR in the commentary section, identifies that one of the key responsibilities of 
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the board should be “reviewing, ratifying and monitoring systems of risk management and 
internal control, codes of conduct, and legal compliance” (Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
Corporate Governance Council, 2007), p.13).  Thus, it is posited that increased board 
monitoring should result in higher quality risk management disclosures within the company’s 
annual report.  In particular, independent directors are considered to enhance the quality of 
the board as they are expected to be more unbiased representatives of shareholders due to an 
assumed absence of conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent (Malin et al., 
2005, O’Sullivan, 2000; Ismail and Rahman, 2011; Probohudono et al., 2013; Sekome & 
Lemma, 2014).  Accordingly, Chen and Jaggi (2000) argue that a board that comprises 
mostly independent non-executive directors is more likely to promote high quality 
performance-related disclosure. Thus, the greater the number of independent directors on the 
board, the more likely the board will identify relevant risks and promote quality risk 
management disclosures to inform shareholders and ensure compliance with ASX listing 
rules and associated ASX CGPR (Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance 
Council, 2007). Thus, the level of risk management disclosure is expected to be closely 
linked to the number of independent directors on a company’s board. 
 
In addition to independence, another important measure of board effectiveness is the level 
of competence or professional expertise of board members (Gray and Nowland, 2013). The 
ASX CGPR (p. 19) under director competencies recommends that “in order to be able to 
discharge its mandate effectively the board should comprise directors possessing an 
appropriate range of skills and expertise” (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate 
Governance Council, 2007). As the level of professional expertise on corporate boards 
increases the board is likely to be in a better position to identify relevant risks issues specific 
to the company and subsequently disclose these issues in annual reports.  Accordingly, for 
our general board effectiveness proxies, the following are hypothesized:   
 
H1A: The level of risk management disclosure is positively related to the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. 
 
H1B: The level of risk management disclosure is positively related to the proportion of 
board members with professional expertise. 
 
The Influence of the Audit Committee 
 
The supervisory role on an independent audit committees (AC) has been previously 
identified as an effective monitoring and bonding mechanism that helps to mitigate agency 
costs and information asymmetry between management and shareholders (Taylor and Zhang, 
2011; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014 ). This opinion has been extensively supported by prior 
research which has tested the importance of ACs in ensuring the adequacy of financial 
control systems (Collier, 1993; Hoitash et al., 2009; Xie et al., 2003, Lary and Taylor, 2012).  
For ASX-listed companies, an audit committee not only monitors the presentation of a ‘true 
and fair’ view regarding financial disclosures, but also plays a critical role in ensuring that the 
non-financial section of a company’s annual report complies with the ASX CGPR (Blue 
Ribbon Committee, 1999; Smith Committee, 2003). Further, an audit committee should 
consider risk management to be a critical oversight function as part of its responsibilities in 
establishing and monitoring appropriate internal control systems. The ASX CGPR (p.27) 
supports this by indicating that the audit committee should report to the board the results of 
the committee’s review of risk management and internal control systems in line with 
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Principle 7 recommendations (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance 
Council, 2007).  As all large Australian listed companies (ASX Listing Rule 12.7) must have 
an AC (as is the case of our sample), board members who serve on the AC would be expected 
to demonstrate both independence and professional expertise characteristics as part of their 
skill base in order to be able to perform the role of AC members (Australian Stock Exchange, 
2010). The ASX CGPR (p.27) indicates that: 
  
“The audit committee should include members who are all financially literate (that is, be able 
to read and understand financial statements); at least one member should have relevant 
qualifications and experience (that is, should be a qualified accountant or other finance 
professional with experience of financial and accounting matters); and some members should 
have an understanding of the industry in which the entity operates” (Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council, 2007).  
 
Prior research has examined the characteristics and qualifications of AC member expertise 
and found that boards valued positively AC members with accounting qualifications and 
audit committee experience (Iyer et al., 2013).  Felo and Solieri (2009) examined the links 
between audit committee composition and disclosure quality and found that adding 
independent audit committee members with financial expertise resulted in improved 
disclosure quality. The skills of AC members are likely to influence the nature and extent of 
risk management disclosures.  Prior evidence in other disclosure contexts supports the 
influential role of an independent AC (Iyer et al, 2013; Felo and Solieri, 2009) and profession 
expertise on the committee (see DeFond et al., 2005). Thus the following are hypothesised: 
 
H2A: The level of risk management disclosure is positively related to the proportion of 
independent members on the audit committee. 
 
H2B: The level of risk management disclosure is positively related to the proportion of 
members on the audit committee with professional expertise. 
 
The Influence of Other Board Committees  
 
Little prior research has specifically examined the effect of the existence of a risk 
management committee (RC) on the extent of RM disclosure. Brown et al. (2009) indicate 
that in many companies, oversight of risk management is beyond the scope and capabilities 
of the audit committee as they tend to focus on the oversight of financial reporting and related 
compliance risks rather than the broad risks categories outlined in the ASX CGPR.  Similarly, 
Daly (2006/2007) argues that many audit committees are overwhelmed by their risk 
management responsibilities. Thus, companies are beginning to establish specific board level 
risk committees to focus on both financial and non-financial risk management.  Research 
tends to support the role of the RC in assisting decisions related to RM disclosures. Hines & 
Peters (2015) indicate that standalone RCs are being increasingly utilised to assist the board 
with their risk management responsibilities but advise there is continuing debate over 
whether standalone RCs improve risk management outcomes of listed companies.  
Subramaniam et al. (2009) identified that specific (standalone) risk management committees 
tend to exist in companies with large boards and independent board chairs.  They observe that 
companies with a combined audit and risk management committee had a different board 
structure, higher financial reporting risk and lower organisational complexity when compared 
with companies with standalone RCs. Sekome & Lemma (2014) explored the association 
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between certain firm characteristics and the formation of a stand-alone RC and found a strong 
positive relationship between the existence of a stand-alone RMC and board independence, 
board size, firm size and industry type.  
 
Tao and Hutchinson (2013) considered the role of compensation and risk committees in 
monitoring the risk behaviour of Australian financial firms just prior to the global financial 
crisis.  The study identified that it was important for risk committees to be composed of 
members who were independent of management, had board and industry experience, met 
frequently and were professionally qualified and thus, capable of improving firm 
performance.  
 
It is also evident in the Australian context that many risk committees are merely 
extensions of the audit committee (i.e. they are joint committees with the same members 
sitting on both boards).  Therefore, we expect that where these committees are standalone 
(the majority of members are not also on the board’s audit committee), they will operate 
independently from the audit committee, and perform more effectively in discharging their 
risk management oversight responsibilities, and including ensuring risk disclosures are more 
completed and useful to stakeholders. Accordingly, the following is hypothesised: 
 
H3: The level of risk management disclosure is positively related to the presence of a 
(standalone) risk committee. 
 
Listed companies have considerable capital invested in information technology (IT) assets 
which are an integral part of their ongoing business operations.  Despite the increasing 
significance of these assets and the continual risks associated with day to day business 
reliance on IT assets, there is evidence of a lack of focus by boards on governing IT and 
managing the risks associated with business reliance on IT. (Huff et al., 2004, 2005, 2006; 
Bart and Turel, 2009, 2010). This lack of board awareness of IT related risks is supported by 
the number of IT service delivery failures by prominent financial institutions and Airlines in 
Australia (e.g. National Australia Bank, Westpac, and Virgin Australia). One recurring piece 
of advice in IT governance literature is that boards should establish a specific committee 
focused on managing risks associated with IT assets.  This committee would include board 
members with specific IT skills or a specialised interest in the management of IT related risks 
(Nolan and McFarlan, 2005; Gillies, 2005; Bjelland and Wood, 2005).  This committee 
should result in greater monitoring of risks associated with IT assets and greater disclosure of 
IT risks in annual reports than is possible without such a committee. Like RCs, the presence 
and influence of TCs is expected to improve the disclosure of risks associated with IT assets, 
and as these assets tend to be prevalent in all areas of modern corporations, the disclosures 
are likely to positively affect the quality of overall RM disclosure. Accordingly, it is 
hypothesized that: 
 
H4: The level of risk management disclosure is positively related to the presence of a 
technology committee. 
 
External Auditing Oversight and Quality 
 
Agency theory suggests that companies audited by high quality audit firms (e.g. ‘Big-4’ 
auditors) disclose more information than those that are not audited by such auditors in order 
12 
 
to mitigate conflict between internal management and external shareholders (De Angelo, 
1981). Higher quality audit firms have reputational capital at stake, as a consequence they are 
more likely to undertake closer scrutiny of a company’s annual report and the extent of their 
compliance with accounting standards than lower quality auditors (Malone et al., 1993) 
Research tends to supports the association between auditor quality and disclosure quality 
(Crasswell and Taylor, 1992; Datar et al., 1991; Malone et al., 1993).  In the context of RM 
disclosure in the Australian context, we would expect a similar association. Thus, we expect 
that companies audited by Big-4 auditors (a common proxy for auditor quality) are more 
likely to have more extensive and better quality RM disclosures than those audited by non-
Big 4 auditors. The expectation is expressed in the following hypothesis: 
 
H5: The level of risk management disclosure is positively related to the engagement of a 
Big-4 external auditor. 
 
Institutional Shareholders 
  
Price (1993) suggests that an increase in the amount of institutional shareholders that a 
company possesses is linked to a greater intervention by these shareholders in determining 
the level of disclosures of corporate information and the requirements for more extensive 
access to corporate information. Thus, greater attention being paid by management to 
information disclosed due to pressure from institutional investors is believed to impact on the 
quality of RM disclosure (Price, 1993).  However, Abraham and Cox (2007) find a negative 
relationship between institutional ownership and extent of RM disclosure risk information in 
UK FTSE 100 annual reports. Ismail & Rahman (2011) and Al-Najjar & Abed (2014) found 
a positive relationship between the level of risk disclosures and institutional investors. In the 
Australian context Taylor and Zhang’s (2011) findings reveal a positive relationship between 
transient-type institutional block shareholders and risk disclosures, but reveal almost no 
influence of dedicated-type institutional shareholders. Following this Australian study, we 
also expect a positive association between institutional investors and RM disclosure. 
However, we do not confine our predictions to transient institutional investors because our 
focus is on the largest listed Australian firms where transient institutional investors are less 
common. We therefore propose the general hypothesis that: 
 
H6: The level of risk management disclosure is positively related to the level of direct 
shareholder ownership by institutional investors. 
 
Corporate Risk Factors 
 
Although a range of disclosure studies have documented the impact of various influential 
factors on the level of RM disclosures, such as governance characteristics, audit 
characteristics and institutional investors, little prior research has addressed the possible 
impact of risk-related factors. As argued in Linsley and Shrives (2006), if companies disclose 
all their material risks in RM disclosures, then it would be expected that common measures of 
corporate risk would be accurately captured in these disclosures. Dobler et al. (2011) found a 
positive association between the level of risk disclosure and the level of firm risk.  Amran et 
al. (2009) found that leverage was not significantly associated with the level of risk 
disclosure. Three common measures of risk are equity (Beta) risk, the market-to-book ratio 
and financial leverage [2]. 
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The standard estimation of systematic equity risk (Beta) has been widely adopted in finance 
studies and can be applied in accounting research as a measurement of market risk (Ryan, 
1997). It is defined as ‘the extent to which stock return for company, including dividends and 
capital gains/losses, vary with the return in the broader financial market’ (Abdelghany, 
2005, p. 868). Consistent with Tao & Hutchinson (2013) a company with higher equity risk 
(which is associated with greater volatility in company valuations) would be expected to 
provide higher levels of RM disclosures due to increased material risks associated with the 
company’s operations and impact on the stability of the company’s share price. This 
increased RM disclosure allows managers to signal accountability to stakeholders and 
demonstrate compliance with the ASX CGPR. Thus, it follows that a company exposed to 
higher levels of risk, as evidenced by more share price volatility, is more likely to disclose 
more information regarding material risks to meet stakeholder information needs than low-
risk firms. Thus, equity beta is expected to be a positively associated with the level of RM 
disclosure.   
 
The market-to-book ratio (MTB) is commonly measured as the firm’s market capitalisation 
divided by the book value of shareholders’ equity. Amongst other interpretations, the MTB 
ratio is considered a measure of risk as it indicates the variance between a firm’s market and 
balance sheet valuations [3]. A larger MTB indicates greater expectations about future cash 
flows than a lower MTB. As future cash flows are inherently uncertain, high MTB firms tend 
to have more volatile share prices than small MTB firms. It is also argued that it captures 
bankruptcy risk because it provides a measure of the amount of capital (relative to current 
market valuation) that investors can retrieve in the event of bankruptcy (Peterkort and 
Nielson, 2005). Thus, companies with larger MTBs would be expected to disclose a greater 
amount of RM information to stakeholders than smaller MTB firms.  
 
A number of accounting based-measures of corporate risk have been identified in the 
literature. The most common is financial leverage (or gearing ratio).  Agency theory suggests 
that potential wealth transfers from debt-holders to shareholders will result in higher agency 
costs. It has been proposed that shareholders will desire a greater amount and transparency of 
information disclosure, including risk-related aspects, to better assess firm value and 
performance and minimise the potential risks associated with their investments (Grandia, 
2003; Hossain et al., 1994). Although not always consistent, a number of prior studies report 
a positive relationship between leverage and corporate disclosure level (Eng and Mak, 2003; 
Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lim et al., 2007).  Consistent with the arguments 
of Amran et al. (2009) corporate management, investors and debtholders are likely to view 
open and transparent RM disclosures as more important as debt levels increase. Thus, a 
positive relationship between RM disclosure and financial leverage is expected.  The above 
arguments for alternative corporate risk measures is summarised in the following three 
hypotheses:  
 
H7a: The level of risk management disclosure is positively related to equity beta risk. 
 
H7b: The level of risk management disclosure is positively related to the market-to-book 
ratio. 
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H7c: The level of risk management disclosure is positively related to the financial 
leverage. 
 
Research Design 
Sample Selection and Data Source 
The sample selected in this study consists of the top 300 ASX listed companies measured by 
market capitalization for year ended 30 June 2010.  For these firms, all RM disclosures 
provided in the corporate governance statements of the 2010 annual reports were identified 
and used in the subsequent analysis of RM disclosures. The analysis of these disclosures is 
expected to provide an appropriate representation of major ASX listed company’s risk 
disclosure patterns over the three years since the introduction of ASX CGPR in 2007 as 
sufficient time has elapsed since the transition period for companies to achieve compliance. 
Within the top 300 list, 20 companies that were delisted or suspended were replaced in the 
sample with the next 20 companies by market capitalization to ensure the sample comprised 
300 companies for the purpose of data collection and analysis [4].The profile of the sample is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Profile of the Sample (Top 300 ASX Listed Companies) 
Industry (GICS) Sector No. of 
Companies 
% of  
Sample 
   
Consumer Discretionary 44  14.7 
Consumer Staples 11 3.7 
Energy 26 8.7 
Financial Services 58 19.3 
Health Care 15 5.0 
Industrials 49 16.3 
Information Technology 8 2.7 
Materials 70 23.3 
Telecommunication Services 6 2.0 
Utilities 13 4.3 
Total 300 100 
 
Two Stage Approach  
To comprehensively address the research questions we use a two stage approach. First we use 
a thematic content analysis followed by common content and regression analysis. It is argued 
that by combining these approaches the robustness and reliability of the overall study can be 
enhanced (Brewer and Hunter, 1989), and is consistent with the research approaches 
suggested by Beattie et al. (2004) as the most appropriate for analysing narrative disclosures 
in company annual reports. Content analysis is the preferred method in many previous 
disclosure studies (e.g. Anita and Lee, 2007; Chatterjee, 2011; Sandhu and Kapoor, 2010; 
Cowan and Gadenne, 2005) and risk management studies and allows the researcher to 
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provide useful insights into the nature and extent of disclosures (Linsley and Shrives (2006), 
Dobler et al (2011), Berettta and Bozollan (2004), Amran et al., 2009; Lajili and Zeghal, 
2005; Taylor and Zhang, 2011, Maffei et al, 2014, Elshandidy et al., 2014; Elshandidy & 
Neri, 2014). However, we extend this approach by using thematic content analysis in addition 
to the more traditional content analysis. The thematic content analysis involved categorising 
RM disclosures within the corporate governance statement to themes using NVivo 10.  The 
RM disclosures were categorised to common themes which were then linked to the risk 
categories identified in Principle 7 Recommendation 1 of the ASX CGPR (Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council, 2007). Abraham and Shrives (2014) also 
employ an extended content analysis approach to categorise risk disclosures into substantive 
and symbolic themes. 
 
  To address RQ1, the extent of the disclosures was assessed by summing the number of 
companies disclosing some level of information relating to a particular theme.  The level of 
information classified as a RM disclosure ranged from minimalist (minor) disclosures which 
a mere mention of a RM concept in one or two sentences to fuller, more detailed (major) 
disclosures extending to a paragraph or longer.  The disclosures were also analysed to 
determine the nature of disclosures by assessing the broad nature of the RM disclosures and 
by assessing the quality of disclosures made within particular themes [5]. 
 
RQ2 considers the explanatory power of a number of governance and other influential 
factors on the level of RM disclosure.  To determine the level of disclosure, corporate 
governance statements in annual reports are accessed and scrutinised. RM disclosure scores 
are then derived according to common content analysis approaches typically used in scoring 
corporate disclosures in annual reports. Three scores are used in the main analysis: an overall 
score for each company based on a coder determined assessment [6] of each sample firm’s 
conformance with each of the 20 RM disclosure items required by ASX CGPR Principle 7; 
and, two sub scores, one based on the first 13 items (relating to specific business risks and 
associated policies) in Principle 7, Recommendation 1 and 4 and the other based on the 
remaining 6 (board oversight, compliance and regulatory) items relating to Principle 7, 
Recommendation 2-4. A score of 1 is given by the coder for each identified major disclosure 
and a 0 for each omitted or minor disclosure, where a major disclosure is defined as a 
statement in an annual report about a risk item that provides sufficient information to assess 
the nature of the underlying risk to the firm and a minor disclosure is defined as a statement 
in an annual report about a risk item that is vague or lacking enough information to assess the 
nature of the underlying risk to the firm. These scores form the dependent variables against 
which the hypothesised influential factors were regressed (as outlined below). 
 
Research Model for Testing Hypotheses  
 
As it is hypothesised RM disclosure is associated with a number of factors the following 
linear regression model (equation 1) is used to jointly test the hypothesised associations with 
the RM disclosure scores: 
 
RMDscore = β0 + β1BINDP + β2BEXPTS + β3ACINDP + β4ACEXPTS + β5RCSA + β6RCAC 
+ β7TC + β8ADBIG4 + β9INSTOWN + β10BETA + β11MTB + β12LEV + β13ROE + 
β14CROE + β15MCAP + β16 INDFIN + β17FOREIGN + e                                      (1)                         
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Where RMDscore is one of the following: 
RMDS = Total score for each company based on an assessment of the company’s 
conformance with each of the 20 RM disclosure items required by ASX CGPR 
Principle 7.  A score of 1 is recorded for each major disclosure and 0 for a minor or 
an omitted disclosure;  
 
RMDSR = An RMDS sub-score for the 13 disclosure items relating to specific business risks 
and associated policies listed in ASX CGPR Principle 7.1 and 7.4. (The 13 items 
are: operational, environmental, sustainability, compliance, strategy, ethical 
conduct, reputation, technological, product/service quality, human capital, financial 
reporting, market-related, and legal risk disclosures) (RMD1-13); and 
 
RMDSC = An RMDS sub-score for the remaining 6 disclosure items identified in ASX CGPR 
Principle 7.2-7.4 relating to board oversight, compliance and regulatory RM issues. 
(RMD14-20). 
 
The Independent Variables comprise the (governance and risk-related) test variables and 
control variables.  
 
Governance Variables:  
BINDP  = proportion of independent non-executives on the board of directors (tests H1a);  
BEXPTS = board expertise, measured as proportion of the board with a relevant degree 
(accounting, business, commerce, finance, economics or law) (tests H1b);  
ACINDP  = proportion of independent non-executives on the audit committee (tests H2a); 
ACEXPTS = audit committee expertise, measured as the proportion of the AC with a relevant 
degree (accounting, business, commerce, finance, economics or law) (tests H2b); 
RCSA  = 1 if the firm has a standalone risk committee and 0 otherwise (tests H3); 
RCAC  = 1 if the firm has a combined risk and audit committee and 0 otherwise (used to 
control for joint committees); 
TC  = 1 if the firm has a technology committee and 0 otherwise (tests H4); 
ADBIG4  = 1 if the firm has a Big-4 external auditor and 0 otherwise (tests H5); 
INSTOWN = percentage of direct share ownership by institutional investors as reported in the 
Osiris (Bureau Van Dijk) database (tests H6); 
 
Risk-related test variables: 
 
BETA   = equity (OLS) beta risk (systematic risk) sourced from the Risk Measurement 
Service, Centre for Research in Finance, Australian Graduate School of 
Management (tests H7a);  
MTB  = market to book ratio, measured as the market capitalisation divided by the book 
value of shareholders’ equity at the fiscal year end date (tests H7b);   
LEV  = financial leverage, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets (tests H7c);   
 
Control Variables:  
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ROE  = return on shareholder's equity, measured by current year income divided by 
shareholders’ equity;  
CROE  = growth in ROE over previous period;  
MCAP  = natural logarithm of market capitalisation;  
INDFIN  = 1 if the firm is in the (GICS) financial service industry sector, 0 otherwise;  
FOREIGN = 1 if the firm has a foreign domicile, 0 otherwise. 
 
The following discussion provides justification and further explanation for the control 
variables used in the regression models. 
 
Corporate Size (MCAP) 
Prior research has documented the notion that the larger the firm, the greater the nature and 
extent of corporate disclosure by the company (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Buzby, 1975; Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Scott, 1994). The positive relationship between 
firm size and level of disclosure is supported by the following arguments. Firstly, larger firms 
may be willing to improve reporting systems since they possess excessive amount of 
resources and capital and the cost associated may be easily compensated (Zeghal et al., 
2007). Secondly, bigger firms are motivated to disclose more information due to pressure 
from external parties such as regulatory parties (Buzby, 1975).  Corporate size (Mcap) is 
measured by market capitalisation for each company as at the 2010 fiscal year end date. 
 
Profitability (ROE & CROE) 
The relationship between performance measures and level of disclosures has been tested by 
prior literature and is also supported by various theories. For instance, agency theory suggests 
that managers disclose information for promoting personal interests as a number of prior 
studies have documented the close relationship between managers’ stock-based compensation 
schemes and extent of disclosures (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Murphy, 1996). Further, 
agency theory suggests that managers seek to disclose more information so that the 
company’s shares are not undervalued by external parties (Inchausti, 1997). In addition, 
political cost theory proposes that companies with large profits are more likely to disclose 
more information to provide sufficient evidence and justifications for their profit levels 
(Inchausti, 1997).  Return on Equity (ROE) is considered one of the most common measures 
of profitability and performance and growth in ROE (CROE) is also considered to provide 
more robust results (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Hannagan, 2007). Therefore, positive 
relationships are expected to exist between ROE and CROE and level of risk disclosures. 
 
Industry 
The financial sector (INDFIN) and materials sector are the two dominant sectors in the 
sample and are expected to possess unique risk characteristics [7].  The financial sector 
consists mainly of companies involved in banking, finance, insurance, investment, real estate, 
etc. and potentially possesses higher risks due to the nature of services provided such as stock 
market forecasts, banking services and data analysis. This sector has been under increasing 
scrutiny by market participants and regulators in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
and its members are therefore expected to be active disclosers of RM information. 
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Foreign Domicile (FOREIGN) 
Approximately 10 per cent of the top 300 firms have foreign domiciles. A preliminary 
analysis of these firms’ risk management revealed a tendency for them to follow their home 
exchange rules and securities’ regulations when disclosing risk management information in 
preference to the specific ASX CGPR Principle 7 disclosure categories. Therefore we expect 
lower disclosures scores for these firms relative to locally domiciled firms. 
 
Results and Analysis 
Nature and Extent of RM Disclosures (RQ1) 
Table 2 reports aggregate disclosure frequencies against each of the 20 risk categories 
identified in the ASX CGPR for the sample companies. To provide an indication of the extent 
and quality of the disclosures, they are classified as “no”, “minor” and “major”. As 
previously defined a minor disclosure is one which is vague or lacking enough information to 
assess the nature of the underlying risk to the firm. The other (more informative) disclosures 
are classified as major.  
Table 2, Panel A reports the frequency of company conformance with each of the 13 material 
business risk management disclosure items in Principle 7. The frequency analysis clearly 
highlights low levels of major disclosures for many of the specific business risk disclosure 
items (RMDS1-13). Those related to technological (RMD1), product/service quality 
(RMD9), and reputation risk (RMD7) have the lowest number of major disclosures by 
companies (less than 5%), whereas those items related to compliance (RMD4), operational 
(RMD1), and financial reporting risks (RMD 11) have the highest number of major  
disclosures by companies (around 10%).  These three RMD’s also have the largest number of 
minor disclosures (20-35%). These results tend to indicate that whilst many companies are 
disclosing within these material business risk areas, the disclosures are minimalist and often 
appear to be a “box-ticking” exercise to risk disclosure. The results suggest that companies 
may be less inclined to disclose sensitive information such as the failures in technological 
innovations, threats of legal action, and issues associated with environmental responsibilities 
and the quality of products and services. Consistent with some prior research, it is possible 
that companies may perceive that the disclosure of sensitive RM information to the 
stakeholders may have a detrimental impact on the company’s share price and reputation. 
  
Further analysis of the business risk disclosures using thematic content analysis is also 
reported in Table 2, Panel A. The results indicate that sample companies report a wide variety 
of risks with 3 to 4 common themes being identified under a number of risk categories within 
the analysis. Notably the market related risk category includes the most themes with 13.  
These results indicate that the nature of risk management disclosure in Australian Listed 
companies appears to be quite broad.  However, the results are consistent with the categorical 
analysis; the thematic analysis shows the extent of risk management disclosure in ASX top 
300 listed companies required by recommendation 7.1 of the ASX CGPR was overall very 
low.  The number of companies with major disclosures on a particular theme was 
predominantly low with only financial reporting and regulatory and compliance being the 
highest with 9 and 10 percent respectively.  All the other themes indicated that the number of 
companies with major disclosures were less than 10% of companies.   
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Table 2  
Frequency of ASXCGPR Risk Management Disclosures 
Panel A: Frequency of Business Risk Management Disclosures by Category & Theme 
RM 
Code 
Disclosure Category/Theme (n=300) 
(Themes in italics below categories) 
No  
Disclosure 
No. (%) 
Minor  
Disclosure 
No. (%) 
Major  
Disclosure  
No. (%) 
RMD1 Operational risks 212 (71) 66 (22) 22 (7) 
 Funding 289 (96) 8 (3) 3 (1) 
 Insurance 270 (90) 24 (8) 6 (2) 
 Operational - Other 229 (76) 50 (17) 21 (7) 
RMD2 Environmental risks 258 (86) 27 (9) 15 (5) 
 Climate Change 294 (98) 4 (1.3) 2 (.7) 
 Environmental - Other 259 (86) 26 (9) 15 (5) 
RMD3 Sustainability risks 267 (89) 18 (6) 15 (5) 
 Liquidity 278 (93) 12 (4) 10 (3) 
 Sustainability 282 (94) 10 (3) 8 (3) 
RMD4 Compliance risks 164 (55) 100 (33) 36 (12) 
 Sustainability 282 (94) 10 (3) 8 (3) 
 Accounting Std. Compliance  258 (86) 34 (11) 8 (3) 
RMD5 Strategic risks 246 (82) 40 (13) 14 (5) 
 Investment 280 (93) 11 (4) 9 (3) 
 Operational Strategy 265 (88) 29 (10) 6 (2) 
 Sales and Marketing 296 (98.6) 2 (.7) 2 (.7) 
 Supplier  295 (98.3) 2 (.7) 3 (1) 
RMD6 Ethical conduct risks (& theme) 276 (92) 12 (4) 12 (4) 
RMD7 Reputation risks (& theme) 281 (94) 15 (5) 4 (1) 
RMD8 Technological risks 287 (95) 8 (3) 5 (2) 
 Information Security 294 (98) 4 (1.3) 2 (.7) 
 IT Failures 295 (98.3) 2 (.7) 3 (1) 
 IT Project Development 294 (98) 4 (1.3) 2 (.7) 
RMD9 Product/service quality risks 279 (93) 20 (6.7) 1 (.3) 
 Allocation of resources 287 (95.7) 12 (4) 1 (.3) 
 Product Service Quality 292 (97) 8 (3) 0 (0) 
RMD10 Human capital risks 237 (79) 47 (16) 16 (5) 
 Occupational Health & Safety 248 (83) 40 (13) 12 (4) 
 Human Resources - Other 283 (94.4) 13 (4.3) 4 (1.3) 
RMD11 Financial reporting risks (& theme) 184 (61) 89 (30) 27 (9) 
RMD12 Market-related risks  230 (77) 53 (18) 17 (5) 
 Competition 289 (96) 7 (3) 4 (1) 
 Credit 280 (93) 13 (4) 7 (3) 
 Equity 291 (96.3) 7 (3) 2 (.7) 
 Commodity Fluctuations 281 (94) 15 (5) 4 (1) 
 Asset Value Changes 290 (96.7) 9 (3) 1 (.3) 
 Macroeconomic Environ’t Changes 290 (96) 5 (2) 5 (2) 
 Monetary Policy Changes 296 (99) 4 (1) 0 (0) 
 Exchange rates 262 (87) 32 (11) 6 (2) 
 Financial Instruments 290 (96) 8 (3) 2 (1) 
 Interest Rates 280 (93) 18 (6) 2 (1) 
 Political 297 (99) 3 (1) 0 (0) 
 Market-related - Other 280 (93) 15 (5) 5 (2) 
RMD13 Legal risk disclosures (& theme) 241 (80) 48 (16) 11(4) 
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Panel B: Frequency of Administrative Risk Management Disclosures  
RM Code Disclosure Category (n=300) 
No  
Disclosure 
No. (%) 
Minor  
Disclosure 
No. (%) 
Major  
Disclosure  
No. (%) 
Disclosure of Material Business Risks and associated 
Policies (Recommendation 7.1 & 7.4)    
RMD14 
Disclosure of board review of effectiveness of 
RM and internal control systems 
 
33 (11) 96 (32) 171 (57) 
RMD15 
Disclosure of internal audit analysis and 
appraisal of effectives of RM and internal 
control systems 
 
221 (73) 35 (12) 44 (15) 
RMD16 
Audit Committee/ Risk Committee 
Assessment of RM information  
 
101 (34) 102 (34) 97 (32) 
RMD17 
Disclosure of board’s ultimate responsibility 
for RM 
 
31 (10) 75 (25) 194 (65) 
Disclosure of Board Compliance with Corporations 
Act requirements (Recommendation 7.3 & 7.4) 
 
RMD18 
Disclosure of board compliance with 
Corporations Act S295A Declaration (based 
on a sound systems of RM and internal 
control systems) 
 
86 (29) 4 (1) 210 (70) 
Disclosure of Departures from Principle 7 & Summary 
of RM policies public available on a website 
(Recommendation 7.4) 
 
RMD19 Departures from ASX CGPR  286 (95.3) 2 (0.7) 12 (4) 
RMD20 Public Availability of RM policies 
 179 (60) 5 (2) 116 (38) 
Notes: Panel A tables the frequency of RM disclosures by category and theme for the 13 material business risk categories 
identified in the ASX CGPR Principle 7, Recommendation 7.1 (Commentary). Within these categories key risk disclosure themes 
were identified using Nvivo 10 analysis.  Multiple themes were identified and are presented for all categories except those with 
single themes (RMD6, 7 and 13). Panel B tables the frequencies for the remaining 7 categories of RM disclosures which are a 
more general (‘administrative’) in nature based on the guidelines contained in Principle 7, Recommendations 7.1 - 7.4. 
Frequencies are classified into no, minor and major, where a minor disclosure is defined as a statement in annual report about a 
risk item that is vague or lacking enough information to assess the nature of the underlying risk to the firm. All other (more 
informative) disclosures are classified as major.  
  
A number of examples highlight the differences in major/minor disclosures. Silex Systems 
Limited (2010) provides a typical major disclosure example in relation to the company’s 
OH&S which outlines detailed procedures used to manage and control this risk factor: 
“The Company recognises the importance of occupational health and safety (OH&S) 
issues and is committed to the highest levels of performance. To help meet this 
objective OH&S Committees have been established to facilitate the systematic 
identification of OH&S issues and to ensure they are managed in a structured and 
rigorous manner. This system has been operating for a number of years and allows 
the Company to: 
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• monitor its compliance with all relevant OH&S legislation and regulations,  
• continually assess and improve the effectiveness of the Company’s OH&S 
program,  
• encourage employees to actively participate in the management of all OH&S 
issues, and 
• reinforce the importance of safe work practices throughout the Company, as 
mandated by management” (Silex Systems Limited, 2010, p. 49). 
 
Our analysis also found that disclosures within some themes varied. For instance, some 
companies such as the Commonwealth Bank of Australia provided detailed (major) 
disclosure in relation to regulatory risks: 
 
“The Group regularly benchmarks and aligns its policy framework against existing 
prudential and regulatory standards. Potential developments in Australian and 
international standards and best practice generally are considered during a review” 
(Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 2010, p. 39). 
In contrast, other companies simply documented phrases in their annual reports regarding 
regulatory changes to express the management’s willingness to “compliance with all 
regulatory and statutory requirements” (Brambles Limited, 2010, p. 25). This extract may 
indicate that some companies are providing minimalistic disclosure on certain RM issues in 
order to satisfy ASX CGPR requirements.   This type of disclosure were considered a minor 
disclosure.  
Two themes which were rated as having very low disclosures were technological failures 
and technology project development and information security.  These themes did not seem to 
garner the same degree of RM disclosure attention, which is concerning when many large 
ASX listed companies are dependent on IT for their daily operations. Large banks which 
form part of the sample, experienced major technological failures during 2010, which were 
reported in the press, however these risks were not disclosed in the annual reports of these 
companies.  This lack of reporting on IT risks may indicate that companies are assessing their 
IT risks as not being material business risks and thus not reportable.  For instance, the 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia did not provide any quality RM disclosure on technology 
risk.  The company only mentioned ‘technological risk’ as a part of ‘operational business:  
 
“Operational risk is defined as the risk of economic loss…It includes legal, regulatory, 
fraud, business continuity and technology risks. The Group’s security risk management 
framework forms part of the operational risk framework and sets out the key roles, 
responsibilities and processes for security risk management across the Group. Security 
risk is defined as threats associated with theft and fraud, information and IT security, 
protective security and crisis management” (Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 2010, p. 
41). 
 
As this disclosure lacks explanation of the type of technological risks and policies and 
procedures to manage these risks it was classified as ‘no’ disclosure for the information 
security theme. However, because of the details provided under the operational theme (of the 
operational risk category) it was rated a major disclosure under this theme. 
 
The results in Table 2, Panel A also highlight that in the majority of material business risk 
categories over 90% of companies disclose nothing at all. This is particularly concerning as it 
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seems unlikely that the majority of listed companies in Australia have little or nothing to 
disclose on the 13 material business risk categories identified by the ASX CGPR in Principle 
7.  This implies that a large number of companies appear to be ignoring the ASX CGPR 
Principle 7 requirement to disclose information about material business risks.  Whilst a large 
number of companies with minor disclosures is below 20%, financial reporting and 
regulatory and compliance with 30% and 26% respectively show that a considerable 
percentage of companies could improve from ‘minor’ to the major disclosures. 
 
As a result of these low disclosure levels on most of the RM items, it could expected that 
companies would have a high level of disclosure under “departures in order to comply with 
the “If not, why not” approach of the ASX CGPR” (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 
2007, p. 40).  However, the “explanation of any departures from Recommendations 7.1, 7.2, 
7.3 or 7.4” (Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council, 2007, p. 
35) is also particularly low with only 4 percent of sample companies reporting any ‘major’ 
departure and 1 percent reporting a ‘minor’ departure. These results cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of Principle 7 of the ASX CGPR in achieving full disclosure of RM information 
in ASX listed companies and the self- reporting principles associated with corporate 
governance disclosures. 
 
Table 2, Panel B shows that for more the remaining, more general (administrative) risk 
disclosure items (RMD14-20) relating to internal control systems, board responsibilities, 
Corporations Act s295A compliance and  Principle 7 departures,  most show higher levels of 
major disclosures and thus higher conformance than for the RMDS1-13 specific disclosure 
items. The exceptions are for RMD15 (audit analysis and appraisal of RM and internal 
control systems, and RMD16 (AC and RC assessment of RM information). Both would 
appear to be straightforward disclosures but less than 50 per cent of firms provide major 
disclosures about these items. 
 
 Further (un-tabulated) analysis of RM disclosures associated with recommendations 2-4 of 
Principle 7 of the ASX CGPR indicated that: 
(a) 57 percent of companies in the sample provided ‘major’  and 32%  provided ‘minor’ 
disclosure on board review (recommendation 7.2 ASX CGPR);  
(b) 67 percent of companies provide ‘major’ disclosure and 25% provided ‘minor’ disclosure 
on whether the board had ultimate responsibility for risk oversight and risk management or 
whether a separate risk management committee exists (recommendation 7.2 ASX CGPR);   
(c) 70 percent of companies provided ‘major’ disclosure and 1% provided ‘minor’ disclosure 
on whether the board had received assurance from the CEO and CFO that the declaration 
provided in s295A of the Corporations Act is founded on a sound system of risk 
management and internal control and that the system is operating effectively in all material 
respects in relation to financial reporting risks (recommendation 7.3 ASX CGPR); and, 
(d) 39 percent of companies provided a ‘major’ disclosure and 2% provided a ‘minor’ 
disclosure about the company having publicly available summary of its RM policies and 
Principle 7 (Recommendation 7.4 ASX CGPR).   
 
Additional analysis revealed noticeable industry differences. The financial services sector 
(banks) provided the most comprehensive RM disclosures, followed by the materials sector.  
In contrast the utilities, telecommunication services, consumer discretionary, consumer 
staples and energy sectors were generally poor RM disclosers.  
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Overall, the assessment of the nature of RM disclosure which addressed the first part of 
RQ1 indicates that the nature of RM disclosure in companies’ annual reports is quite broad 
(33 RM disclosure themes which were linked to the 13 risk categories identified in 
Recommendation 7.1 of the ASX CGPR).  However, the extent of RM disclosures in the top 
300 ASX listed companies was overall very low with only 2 themes having major disclosure  
levels around 10%.  Despite this low level of disclosure in relation to recommendation 1 of 
Principle 7 of the ASX CGPR, companies did not provide information on why they had not 
disclosed as required by recommendation 7.4 of the ASX CGPR.   The thematic content 
analysis process also identified that some companies disclosed high quality RM information 
while other company disclosures were vague and minimalist, lacking the explanation of 
monitoring procedures and the identification of economic impacts that companies may 
experience if these risks are not controlled appropriately.  The more concerning issue is the 
large number of companies that failed to make any disclosure on the 13 material business risk 
areas. 
 
Factors Influencing Risk Management Disclosure (RQ2) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Disclosure Scores: Following the tenor of the previously results, Table 3, Panel A shows that 
the mean for overall RM disclosure score  (RMDS1) is a low 7.12 (out of the 20) for the ASX 
CGPR disclosure items required under Principle 7. Thus, the top 300 companies are only 
disclosing an average of 35.6% of the RM disclosure items, and this result is considerably 
lower (mean of 3.39 out of 13 or 26%) when only the business risk disclosure items (RMDR) 
are considered. The low disclosures levels should be of concern to the corporate regulators as 
it indicates potential ineffectiveness of the ASX’s CGPR in regulating RM disclosure.  
 
Governance Variables: Panel A further shows than most boards are independent (BINDP 
mean = 68.1%) and nearly half have professional expertise (BEXPTS mean = 46.7%). A 
similar level of expertise is evident in ACs (ACEXPTS mean = 50.6%), but member 
independence is much lower (ACINDP mean = 25.8%).  Thus, boards should have sufficient 
opportunities to discuss risk-related issues. Panel B of Table 4 indicates that most of the top 
ASX listed companies (54.7%) have a risk committee (RC) but only 15 percent have (the 
expected more effective) standalone committee (RCSA). The remainder are combined with 
their ACs (RCAC frequency = 39.7%).  Also, most firms are audited by a Big 4 auditor 
(ADbig4) (88% of firms). In contrast, only 2.67 percent of the sample companies had a 
technology committee (TC), implying a lack of awareness or interest in risks associated with 
the technology operations in these companies. Consequently, apart from TCs, these statistics 
reveal, a high level of control and monitoring that should be exercised by company 
committees and professional auditors in assessing and ensuring appropriate communication 
of corporate RM practices. 
  
Risk Factors: For the hypothesised risk factors Table 3, Panel A shows the median equity 
beta (BETA) is 1.115 which is only slight above market beta. Therefore, sample companies 
are not exposed to high levels of systematic risk. Likewise the sample firms do not have high 
market-to-book ratios (MTB median = 1.53) and are not highly leveraged (LEV median = 
41.7%), indicating that sample companies are not likely to be facing high levels of market or 
financial risk, and related pressure to disclosure information about those risks. Similarly, high 
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disclosure demands are also likely to be absent from a financial performance perspective as 
the median return-on-equity (ROE) is a relatively high 7.9% and has increased over the 
previous year (CROE median = 1.9%). 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Frequency of Categorical Variables 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Model Variables N Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
RM Disclosure Scores  
RMDS (RMD1 -20) 300 7.217 7.000 3.987 0 19 
RMDSR  (RMD1 -13) 300 3.390 3.000 3.121 0  13
RMDSC (RMD14 - 20) 300  3.827 4.000 1.469 0  7
Governance Variables 
BINDP (Board independence) 300  0.681 0.710 0.167 0.3  1
BEXPTS (Board expertise) 293  0.467 0.450 0.236 0  1
ACINDP (audit committee 
independence) 300  0.258 0.250 0.101 0  0.5
ACEXPTS (audit committee 
expertise) 300  0.506 0.500 0.294 0  1
INSTOWN (Institutional 
ownership) 297 49.463 49.65 26.299 0 99.34 
Risk Variables 
BETA (equity risk) 292  1.266 1.115 0.674 0.300  2.990
MTB (market-to-book ratio) 300 2.59 1.53 4.75 -21.21 56.91 
LEV (liabilities-to-assets) 300 0.417 0.415 0.240 0.007 1.369 
Control Variables 
ROE (return-on-equity) 300 0.082 0.079 0.502 -7.384 3.021 
CROE (change in ROE) 300 0.057 0.019 0.899 -13.695 4.058 
MCAP (market capitalisation) 
($m) 300 396.0 99.9 1117.2 22.0 12,640 
Panel B: Frequency of Categorical Governance Variables 
Model Variables 1 = Yes % 0 = No % 
RC (risk committee) 164 54.7 136 45.3 
RCSA (standalone RC) 45 15.0 255 85.0 
RCAC (RC & AC combined) 119 39.7 181 60.3 
TC (Technology committee) 8 2.7 292 97.3 
ADBIG4 (audit by Big 4) 263 87.7 37 12.3 
INDFIN (financial Service 
sector) 58 19.3 242 80.7 
FOREIGN (foreign domicile) 30 10.0 270 90.0 
Notes: RMDS = sum of scores for all Principle 7 recommended disclosure categories (RMD1-20); RMDSR = 
sum of scores for 7.1 & 7.4 recommended disclosure categories (Material Business Risks and associated 
Policies) (RMD1-13); RMDSC = sum of scores for other Principle 7 recommended disclosure categories 
(RMD14-20) were a score of 1 is recorded for each major disclosure and 0 for a minor or an omitted 
disclosure. ACINDP = proportion of independent non-executives on the audit committee. ACEXPTS = audit 
committee expertise - proportion of the AC with a relevant degree (accounting, business, commerce, finance, 
economics or law). BINDP = proportion of independent non-executives on the board of directors. BEXPTS = 
board expertise - proportion of the board with a relevant degree (accounting, business, commerce, finance, 
economics or law); INSTOWN = percentage of direct share ownership by institutional investors. BETA = equity 
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(OLS) beta risk (systematic risk). MTB = market to book ratio - market capitalisation divided by book value of 
shareholders’ equity. LEV = leverage, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets (a measure of financial 
risk). MCAP = natural logarithm of market capitalisation; ROE = return on shareholder's equity, measured by 
current year income divided by shareholders’ equity. CROE = change in ROE over previous period; RC = 1 if 
the firm has a risk committee, 0 otherwise. RCSA = 1 if the firm has a standalone risk committee, 0 otherwise. 
RCAC = 1 if the firm has a combined risk and audit committee, 0 otherwise; TC = 1 if the firm has a technology 
committee, 0 otherwise. ADBIG4 = 1 if the firm has a Big-4 external auditor, 0 otherwise. INDFIN = 1 if the firm 
is in the financial service industry sector, 0 otherwise. FOREIGN = 1 if the firm has a foreign domicile, 0 
otherwise. 
 
 
Correlation Analysis 
Table 4 documents the Pearson and Spearman correlations between the continuous 
independent variables (IV) prior to conducting the regression analysis.  In relation to the 
dependent variables (DV), for ease of exposition only the overall RM disclosure (RMDS) is 
included in this correlation analysis. The correlation analyses presents preliminary evidence 
of the possible relationships between independent and dependent variables used in the 
regression models. Notably, the results show that the overall disclosure score (RMDS) is 
significantly correlated with Board and AC expertise (BEXPTS and ACEXPTS), the presence 
of a standalone risk committee (RCSA) but not for joint committees ((RCAC), the presence of 
a technology committee (TC), and the use of a Big 4 auditor (ADbig4). Notably, financial 
leverage (LEV) is the only risk proxy that is significantly correlated with RMDS.  It is evident 
that correlations between variables are low, indicating that multicollinearity threats are 
minimal and should therefore not hinder the interpretation of subsequent regression results. 
 
Regression Analysis 
Table 5 displays the results generated from estimating the regression models used to jointly 
test the hypothesised relationships. Despite the reasonable explanatory power of the models 
(adjusted R2 range from 18.9% to 26.5%) and the correlation results reported above, mixed 
results are shown in the table for the hypothesised associations. These are discussed below. 
 
Board Characteristics (H1A&B): Contrary to expectation none of the board governance factors 
for independence (BINDP) and professional expertise (BEXPTS appear to have a significant 
impact on the level of the RM disclosures in any of the models. Thus hypotheses 1a and 1b 
are not supported.    
 
Audit, Risk and Technology Committees (H2A&B , H3, H4): We hypothesised that the level of 
RM disclosure is positively related to audit committee independence and expertise (H2A&B), 
the presence of a risk committee (H3) and a technology committee (H4). The results from the 
analysis in Table 5 indicate no significant influence of audit committee independence in any 
RM disclosure models; therefore H2A is not supported. However, AC expertise is significantly 
predictor in the RMDSC model.   Additionally, the existence of a standalone risk committee 
(RCSA) in all models, a technology committee (TC) in the overall model (RMDS), and 
specific business risk model (RMDSR) have significant explanatory power. Interestingly, the 
combined RC and AC variable (RCAC) only has some explanatory power in the RMDSC 
model which suggests that standalone risk committees are more effective in facilitating 
greater RM disclosures than combined audit/risk committees.  Thus, in contrast to the lack of 
explanatory power for the board of director attributes, the board committees examined here 
are generally influential in improving RM disclosures as predicted (H2B , H3 and H4 ). 
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Table 4 
Correlation Analysis  
 
RMDS RCSA RCAC TC ADBIG4 INSTOWN BINDP BEXPTS ACINDP ACEXPTS MTB BETA MCAP LEV ROE CROE INDFIN FOREIGN 
RMDS .223** -0.011 .165** .151** -0.005 0.023 .145* -0.105 .127* -0.046 -0.054 .290** .151** 0.008 0.112 .200** -.147* 
RCSA .249** -.341** .220** .129* 0.036 0.029 0.018 -0.063 -0.034 -.114* -0.027 .147* .159** 0.010 0.030 .196** -0.109 
RCAC -0.025 -.341** -0.092 0.055 .115* 0.026 -0.028 0.038 0.068 0.065 0.023 0.009 0.092 0.094 0.036 -.138* -0.066 
TC .215** .220** -0.092 0.062 0.003 0.096 0.093 -0.097 0.096 -0.001 -0.104 .153** .186** 0.105 -0.038 .129* -0.055 
ADBIG4 .145* .129* 0.055 0.062 0.109 0.105 0.095 -0.101 0.021 -0.076 -0.075 .180** .183** 0.055 -0.018 -0.022 0.091 
INSTOWN 0.002 0.032 .136* 0.012 0.103 0.012 -0.047 -0.038 0.062 -0.060 0.032 .134* 0.011 0.008 -0.005 -.123* -0.092 
BINDP 0.030 0.034 0.016 0.091 0.080 0.010 0.055 0.003 -0.025 -0.023 -0.027 .204** .122* 0.001 -.116* 0.014 -0.013 
BEXPTS .160** 0.003 -0.022 0.111 0.096 -0.051 0.048 -0.008 .598** 0.010 -.157** 0.081 .177** 0.077 0.057 .287** -0.097 
ACINDP  -0.050 -0.024 0.068 -0.059 -0.063 -0.026 0.107 0.012 .120* .159** 0.068 -.165** -0.088 0.032 -0.013 0.018 -0.071 
ACEXPTS .137* -0.039 0.068 0.096 0.019 0.053 -0.034 .620** 0.101 0.052 -0.021 .119* .124* 0.099 0.041 .212** -.117* 
MTB -0.045 -0.113 0.065 0.003 -0.063 -0.061 0.038 0.018 .121* 0.051 0.021 0.009 -0.100 .401** -.137* -.267** -0.069 
BETA -0.092 -0.016 0.024 -0.104 -0.085 0.035 -0.010 -.204** 0.090 -0.063 -0.003 -.143* -.142* -0.079 .142* -0.087 -.119* 
MCAP .402** .177** 0.001 .212** .177** 0.111 .201** 0.090 -0.099 .115* 0.002 -.173** .215** .145* -0.019 .124* -0.047 
LEV .219** .177** 0.071 .207** .179** 0.007 .114* .175** -0.054 .152** -.120* -.165** .270** .241** -0.035 0.112 0.006 
ROE 0.040 0.010 0.094 0.105 0.055 0.006 -0.006 0.071 0.038 .115* .351** -0.113 .172** .240** 0.086 -0.019 -0.044 
CROE 0.105 0.030 0.036 -0.038 -0.018 -0.013 -.140* 0.043 -0.015 0.044 -.118* .145* -0.016 -0.030 0.086 .207** -0.024 
INDFIN .247** .196** -.138* .129* -0.022 -.126* 0.021 .287** -0.005 .222** -.224** -0.078 .158** .158** -0.019 .207** -.135* 
FOREIGN -.169** -0.109 -0.066 -0.055 0.091 -0.104 -0.042 -0.112 -0.052 -.116* -.114* -0.113 -0.051 0.000 -0.044 -0.024 -.135* 
*,** Correlation is significant at the 0.05, 0.01 level (2-tailed), respectively. Pearson (Spearman Rho) Correlations are shown in the bottom (top) diagonal. Variable descriptions are as 
shown in Table 3 notation. 
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Table 5 
Regression Results - Risk Management Disclosure Scores & Influential Factors 
Dependent 
Variables   RMDS   RMDSR   RMDSC   
Predictors 
Expected 
Sign 
Std. 
Coeff. t-stat Sig.
Std. 
Coeff. t-stat Sig. 
Std. 
Coeff. t-stat Sig. 
Intercept -3.565 ** -3.999 ** -.952
Governance 
Variables 
BINDP + -0.077 -1.419 -0.086 -1.542 -0.028 -0.488
BEXPTS + 0.072 1.040 0.088 1.235 0.009 0.129
ACINDP + 0.015 0.291 0.004 0.078 0.034 0.614
ACEXPTS + 0.006 0.088 -0.052 -0.751 0.132 1.859 * 
RCSA + 0.125 2.134 * 0.104 1.726 * 0.124 2.011 * 
RCAC + 0.015 0.257 -0.025 -0.427 0.096 1.611 ^ 
TC + 0.076 1.406 ^ 0.106 1.910 * -0.020 -0.343
ADBIG4 + 0.067 1.249 0.071 1.277 0.034 0.601
INSTOWN + -0.035 -0.657 -0.043 -0.783 -0.004 -0.077
 
Risk Factors 
BETA + -0.015 -0.280 -0.009 -0.168 -0.023 -0.391
MTBr + 0.017 0.280 0.033 0.524 -0.025 -0.380
LEV + 0.085 1.434 ^ 0.072 1.190 0.080 1.286 ^ 
Control Variables 
ROEr + -0.077 -1.280 -0.067 -1.078 -0.071 -1.116
CROEr + 0.105 1.922 * 0.072 1.279 0.138 2.407 ** 
MCAP + 0.388 6.664 ** 0.362 6.069 ** 0.294 4.815 ** 
INDFIN + 0.085 1.426 ^ 0.111 1.817 * -0.006 -0.088
FOREIGN - -0.113 -2.121 * -0.056 -1.035 -0.193 -3.470 ** 
Adj. R-squared 0.265 0.226 0.189
F-Stat. 7.013 ** 5.879 ** 4.886 ** 
N  284    284     284   
^, *, ** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level (1-tailed), respectively.  
RMDS = total score for each company based on an assessment of the company’s conformance with each of the 20 
RM disclosure items required by ASX CGPR Principle 7 were a score of 1 is recorded for each major disclosure 
and 0 for a minor or an omitted disclosure. RMDSR = a RMDS sub-score for the 13 disclosure items relating to 
specific business risks and associated policies listed in ASX CGPR Principle 7.1 and 7.4. (The 13 items are: 
operational, environmental, sustainability, compliance, strategy, ethical conduct, reputation, technological, 
product/service quality, human capital, financial reporting, market-related, and legal risk disclosures) (RMD1-13). 
RMDSC = a RMDS sub-score for the remaining 6 disclosure items identified in ASX CGPR Principle 7.2-7.4 relating 
to board oversight, compliance and regulatory RM issues. (RMD14-20). All other variable descriptions are as shown 
in Table 3 notation except that MTBr, ROEr and CROEr are ranked measures of the underlying variables to correct 
for non-normality. 
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External Governance Factors - Auditor and Institutional Investor Influence (H5 & H6): Table 
5 further reveals positive associations between Big-4 auditor and the RM disclosure 
categories, but all are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Similarly, the results in 
the table indicate an insignificant relation between our institutional investor ownership proxy 
(INSTOWN) and RM disclosure scores in all three RM disclosure models. Two recent studies, 
Taylor and Zhang (2011) and Ismail and Rahman (2011) tested the effect of different types of 
institutional investors on the level of RM disclosure and find some supporting evidence. 
Differences in variable measurement may explain the differences in results because our 
institutional investor proxy differs from those prior studies. Thus, neither H5 nor H6 is 
supported for the expected influence of external auditor quality and institutional investors on 
the level of RM disclosure.  
 
Corporate Risk Measures (H7A-7C): It is hypothesised that the level of RM disclosure is 
positively related to equity beta risk (BETA) (H7A), the market-to-book ratio (MTB) (H7B) and 
financial leverage (LEV) (H7C). However, consistent with the UK findings of Linsley and 
Shrives (2006), the results shown in Table 5 indicate that, apart from leverage, risk factors do 
not have explanatory power in the RM disclosure models. Thus, only hypothesis H7C is 
supported for in the overall model. This finding appears to be mainly due to the influence this 
risk measure has on the specific business risk disclosures as captured in the RMDSR model.  
 
Control Variables: The Table 5 results are consistent with prior studies (e.g. Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Hannagan, 2007) in that corporate size (MCAP) and changes in return-on-
equity (CROE) are linked to a higher level of RM disclosure, whereas return-on-equity (ROE) 
does not appear to lead to a greater level of RM disclosure. As expected, the results show that 
firms in the financial services sector (INDFIN) provide high levels of business risk (RMDSR) 
and overall RM disclosures (RMDS). Also consistent with expectation, foreign domicile firms 
(FOREIGN) provide lower levels of RM disclosures due their tendency to comply with their 
home exchange rules for risk management reporting and this is most evident in the 
compliance sub-category (RMDSC) model.  
 
Robustness Tests 
A number of further tests were conducted to strengthen the robustness of the findings with 
respect to the scoring method used to construct the RM disclosure index. We originally 
awarded one for each identified major disclosure and zero for a minor or an omitted 
disclosure. The reasoning behind this approach was that many of the minor disclosures were 
generally vague, minimalistic disclosures (boilerplate) that offered little useful information. 
Many appeared to simply give the impression of complying with ASX CGPR requirements. 
However, by grouping minor with the omitted category there still remains a possibility that 
we may have introduced an overly conservative bias in our hypothesis tests. Therefore, we 
recoded all the disclosures in each of the 20 categories (RMD1-20) with a score of two for 
each identified major disclosure, one for a minor, or zero for an omitted disclosure. This 
revised coding method implicitly increases the weighting for the insufficient disclosures. 
Table 6 provides the regression results from re-estimating the model with the revised 
alternative disclosure index (RMDS2).  It is evident that while the results are similar, they are 
generally weaker when considering the lower model explanatory power (the adjusted R2 is 
now lower for all models).  Also contrary to expectation, the coefficient on the financial 
services sector variable (INDFIN) is now significantly negative.  
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Table 6 
Regression Results - Risk Management Disclosure Alternative Scores & 
Influential Factors 
Dependent 
Variables   RMDS2   RMDSR2   RMDSC2   
Predictors 
Expected 
Sign 
Std. 
Coeff. t-stat Sig.
Std. 
Coeff. t-stat Sig. 
Std. 
Coeff. t-stat Sig. 
Intercept -0.690 -2.637 ** 2.241 * 
Governance 
Variables 
BINDP + -0.018 -0.304 -0.042 -0.730 0.025 0.410
BEXPTS + -0.023 -0.310 0.020 0.268 -0.072 -0.934
ACINDP + 0.078 1.389 ^ 0.121 2.153 * -0.017 -0.297
ACEXPTS + 0.034 0.461 -0.049 -0.670 0.131 1.751 * 
RCSA + 0.027 0.423 -0.015 -0.242 0.072 1.110
RCAC + -0.039 -0.648 -0.107 -1.767 * 0.072 1.157
TC + -0.003 -0.055 0.089 1.531 ^ -0.129 -2.147 * 
ADBIG4 + 0.087 1.501 ^ 0.112 1.945 * 0.011 0.189
INSTOWN + -0.089 -1.555 ^ -0.067 -1.174 -0.078 -1.319 ^ 
 
Risk Factors 
BETA + -0.070 -1.194 -0.058 -0.990 -0.054 -0.894
MTBr + -0.261 -3.902 ** -0.174 -2.615 ** -0.258 -3.753 ** 
LEV + 0.013 0.205 0.007 0.116 0.015 0.226
Control Variables 
ROEr + 0.008 0.131 -0.004 -0.055 0.021 0.317
CROEr + 0.146 2.489 ** 0.122 2.088 * 0.111 1.832 * 
MCAP + 0.320 5.127 ** 0.343 5.508 ** 0.139 2.162 * 
INDFIN + -0.096 -1.493 ^ -0.033 -0.515 -0.138 -2.085 * 
FOREIGN - -0.084 -1.471 ^ 0.021 0.363 -0.189 -3.218 ** 
Adj. R-squared 0.153 0.157 0.100
F-Stat. 4.009 ** 4.105 ** 2.847 ** 
N 284 284   284
^, *, ** significant at the 0.1, 0.05, 0.01 level (1-tailed), respectively.  
RMDS2 = total score for each company based on an assessment of the company’s conformance with each of the 20 
RM disclosure items required by ASX CGPR Principle 7 where a score of 2 is recorded for each identified major 
disclosure, 1 for a minor, or 0 for an omitted disclosure. RMDSR2 = a RMDS2 sub-score for the 13 disclosure 
items relating to specific business risks and associated policies listed in ASX CGPR Principle 7.1 and 7.4. (The 13 
items are: operational, environmental, sustainability, compliance, strategy, ethical conduct, reputation, technological, 
product/service quality, human capital, financial reporting, market-related, and legal risk disclosures) (RMD1-13). 
RMDSC2 = a RMDS2 sub-score for the remaining 6 disclosure items identified in ASX CGPR Principle 7.2-7.4 
relating to board oversight, compliance and regulatory RM issues. (RMD14-20). All other variable descriptions are as 
shown in Table 3 notation except that MTBr, ROEr and CROEr are ranked measures of the underlying variables to 
correct for non-normality. 
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We also use a further coding scheme that allocates scores down to the individual theme 
level (the sub-item levels for each of the RMD1-13 categories shown in Table 2). Instead of a 
maximum score of 13 for RMD1-13 this new coding scheme produces a maximum score 29. 
The (un-tabulated) results produced from re-estimating our regressions based on the 
expanded coding scheme were again weaker than those produced under the original coding 
scheme. Thus finer, more detailed coding schemes appear to be unproductive in further 
explaining the nature and extent of risk disclosures under the ASX’s risk disclosure 
framework. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Motivated by the paucity of research on risk management disclosures in a world that is 
increasingly concerned about corporate risk, the objective of this study has been to better 
understand the effectiveness of RM disclosures in communicating information about 
corporate risk. We investigated firms in the Australian setting where a principle-based 
approach applies to the governance practices of firms listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX). In contrast to other settings examined in prior research this principle-based 
(“if not, why not”) approach is augmented by guidelines which identify risk management 
areas that the ASX expects listed firms to comment on in their annual report disclosures. 
Thus, in contrast to previous research we were able to specifically examine RM disclosures 
against a benchmark thereby shedding light on how managers exercise their disclosure 
discretion. This enabled us to identify areas of disclosure that managers prefer or avoid. To 
achieve our objective our research questions focused on the nature and extent of corporate 
risk management disclosures (RQ1), and the risk and governance factors that impact on the 
level of risk management disclosures (RQ2) under the ASX corporate governance reporting 
framework.  
 
With respect to RQ1 our results reveal widespread divergence in disclosure practices and 
low conformance with the ASX’s Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
(ASX CGPR) Principle 7. In fiscal year 2010 approximately one-half of the top 300 ASX 
listed companies did not disclose any significant information on the 13 major risk categories 
contained in recommendation 1 of the Principle 7 guidance and provided limited information 
on aspects of the other recommendations. Where disclosures are made, our thematic analysis 
indicates that the disclosure quality is generally not high. Often the disclosures were 
minimalistic and appear to be a “box-ticking” exercise against the ASX guidelines. Of 
concern, the findings suggest that companies are less inclined to disclose sensitive 
information such as the failures in technological innovations, threats of legal action, and 
issues associated with environmental responsibilities and the quality of products and services. 
Thus companies appear to be failing to disclose all ‘material business risks’ as anticipated in 
the ASX’s recommendations. There may be various reasons for such non-conformance. For 
example, it may be due to ignorance at the management/board level or due to the intentional 
withholding of sensitive information from financial statement users. This non-conformance 
issue is worthy of further research, possibly using a survey or interview method.    
 
With respect to RQ2, the findings show mixed results across the factors expected to 
influence disclosure behaviour and vary according to the specific RM disclosure sub-category 
examined. Factors found to be associated with improved levels of disclosure include: audit 
committee (AC) expertise, the presence of a risk committee (RC) (in particular, a standalone 
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RC), and a technology committee. Surprisingly, apart from financial leverage, we do not find 
evidence that company risk measures (as proxied by equity beta and the market-to-book 
ratio) are significantly associated with greater levels of RM disclosure. Also, contrary to 
common findings in the disclosure literature (e.g. Malone et al. 1993), factors such as board 
independence and expertise, audit committee independence, and the usage of a Big-4 auditor 
do not seem to impact the level of RM disclosure in the Australian context.  These findings 
for RQ2 support the RQ1 findings in that the risk management disclosures provided in annual 
reports do not appear to reflect how the real underlying risks encountered by ASX-listed 
companies are managed with these firms.  
 
Although the findings are subject to the usual limitations of content analysis (i.e. coding 
and scoring issues) and selection issues associated with the choice of sample and study 
period, the results nevertheless suggest that the top Australian listed companies are not 
providing the level of disclosure of risk management practices and strategies as 
recommended by the ASX in their corporate governance guidelines. Notably, we rarely 
observed instances of firms complying with the “if not, why not” principle in their RM 
disclosure practices. This makes it difficult for users of the annual reports to assess the extent 
to which the various ASX risk management categories are relevant to specific companies. 
Furthermore, while corporate governance appears to play some part in improving the nature 
and extent of RM disclosure it is concerning that risk does not appear to play a greater role in 
influencing disclosure behaviour. The implication is that the RM disclosures practices 
observed under the ASX corporate governance disclosure framework may not be meeting the 
objectives of regulators and the needs of stakeholders. Further guidance and oversight by the 
ASX or by external auditors, and greater internal oversight (through standalone risk and 
technology committees) may therefore be necessary to raise the standard of these disclosures. 
On this issue, we encourage further research on alternative approaches that may lead to more 
effective risk management disclosure.  
 
Notes 
1. ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 requires a company to provide in its annual report – a corporate 
governance statement.  The corporate governance statement must disclose the extent to which the 
company has followed the recommendations in the ASX Corporate Governance Code (CGC) 
during the period.  Principle 7 of this Code contains very detailed requirements on risk that 
Australian listed companies must comply with and disclose this compliance in the corporate 
governance statement in the annual report. Although the “if not why not” approach in Australia, is 
similar to the “comply and explain” approach in the UK, the risk disclosure requirements are quite 
different as the UK corporate governance (2012) code has  minimal risk disclosure requirements. 
While they have increased in the 2014 version, they remain minimal in comparison to the ASX’s 
CGC, Principle 7 requirements. 
2.  In sensitivity analysis, we also test other measures of risk including, total equity risk, industry 
adjusted Beta, asset coverage, operating risk, and bankruptcy risk (Z-scores). However, as none of 
these measures were significant in explaining RM disclosure scores and many are highly correlated 
we have excluded them from our main analyses reported later in the paper. 
3. See Peterkort and Nielson (2005) and Dempsey (2010). The market-to-book ratio is also 
considered to be a measure of growth opportunities. Firms with great growth opportunities are 
generally considered to be more risky. 
4. Subsequent analysis revealed missing data for 16 firms and these firms were excluded from the 
regression estimations. 
5. Examples of RM disclosures which were identified as being extensive in nature under particular 
themes are included later in the paper to demonstrate compliance with the ASX CGPR. 
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6. A second coder was used to verify the accuracy of the scoring approach based on an independent 
assessment of the entire sample of RM disclosures. All data coding was then independently 
reviewed by a one of the authors to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the data coding. 
7. We excluded the materials sector after sensitivity analysis revealed no significant association 
between this sector and RM disclosure scores. We find similar insignificant associations when we 
test the remaining GICS sectors. 
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Detailed Analysis of Risk Management Disclosure Literature (1991-2014)         Appendix 1 
Authors Journal/Conference 
Where study 
conducted Method 
Period 
of 
Study Sample Theory applied Measurement Approach Main Results 
Marston & Shrives 
(1991) 
British Accounting 
Review 
UK  Conceptual 1991 N/A  No theory N/A  Review of the literature indicates that index 
construction and awarding scores is difficult and 
involves subjective judgement on the part of the 
researchers. 
Anonymous (2002) Balance Sheet Journal  UK  Conceptual 1999 Discussion of 
Annual Report 
Requirements 
 No theory N/A  Position paper on risk management within the 
corporate environment.  Recommended directors 
present disclosures of key risk planned and 
relevant measures.   
 Followed by Turnbull report (1999) which links 
internal control to the risk management and 
recommends a risk based approach to 
establishing a sound system of internal control. 
Solomon et al. (2000) British Accounting 
Review 
UK  Survey 2000 Survey of 552 
institutional 
investors 
 Development of an 
internal control, RM and 
Risk Disclosure 
Framework.   
 Focuses on the disclosure 
aspect of conceptual 
framework for IC.   
 Survey of UK institutional investors 
canvassing their attitudes towards risk 
disclosure in relation to their portfolio 
investment decisions. 
 Findings indicate that institutional investors do 
not generally favour a regulated environment for 
corporate risk disclosure or a general statement 
of business risk.  
 Respondents agree that increased risk disclosure 
would help them with portfolio investment 
decisions.  
Linsmeier et al. 
(2002) 
Accounting review US Hypothesis and 
Statistical testing 
 1997 337 SEC companies  No theory applied – 
Regulation on 10-K 
market risk disclosures 
discussed. 
 Content analysis of risk information 
disclosed in relation to10-K Market risk 
disclosures. 
 Found that 34% of sample companies did not 
disclose risk information. 
 65% disclosed risk information.  
Carlon et al. (2003) Australian accounting 
review 
Australia Content analysis 1998 Annual reports of 54 
Australian listed 
companies in mining 
sector  
 No theory  Content analysis of risk disclosures.  Found no agreed conceptual framework 
internationally on regulating reporting of risk.  
 Discussed alternative definitions of risk and the 
scope of risk reporting. 
 Found considerable variation in the content and 
level of RM disclosures in Australian Mining 
sector. 
Beattie et al. (2004) Accounting forum N/A Conceptual, 
content analysis 
1999 Annual reports of 11 
UK companies from 
the Food and 
Beverage sector. 
 Introduces a 4 
dimensional framework 
for holistic content 
analysis of accounting 
narratives. Computer 
implementation 
recommended. 
 Content analysis of risk disclosures. 
 Risk disclosures analysed by 
considering topic + time orientation + 
financial orientation + quantitative 
orientation. 
 Explored quality and the problematic nature of 
quality measurements.   
 Discussed limitations of prior measurement 
approaches. 
 Identified new attributes of quality.  
 Method discussed and further extended to 
suggest possible new dimensions of disclosure 
quality 
 Presented a diagram of approaches to analysis 
of narratives. 
Beretta & Bozzolan 
(2004) 
International journal of 
accounting 
Italy Content Analysis, 
Disclosure Index 
and regression 
analysis 
2001 Annual reports of 85 
non-financial 
companies listed on 
Italian Stock 
Exchange 
 Proposed a framework for 
the analysis of voluntary 
risk disclosures that 
considers 4 different but 
complementary 
dimensions- content, 
economic sign, types of 
measures and managerial 
approach. 
 Content analysis- used sentences as the 
unit of analysis. Coding based on 
content, economic sign, type of 
measure, and outlook orientation. 
 Considered quantity, depth, density and 
outlook profile as ways to measure risk 
disclosures. 
 Categorised RM disclosures into type 
of measures and developed disclosure 
index. 
 Regression analyses undertaken. 
 Disclosure of risk is narrative by nature - 
quantity of disclosure is not a suitable proxy for 
disclosure quality. 
 Identified that quality depends on both quantity 
of disclosure and richness of its content.  
 Richness is a function of type of content 
disclosed, type of measures used to disclose the 
expected impacts of considered factors and the 
approach management adopted to disclose 
identified risks.    
 Found in regression analysis that quality is not 
influenced by company size or industry. 
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Linsley & Shrives 
(2005) 
Journal of risk finance UK  Content Analysis 2001 Annual reports of 79 
UK public 
companies 
 No theory. Prior literature 
discussed. 
 Content analysis: used sentence based 
approach.  
 RM voluntary disclosures categorised 
into monetary or non-monetary, good, 
bad or neutral news, future or past 
information. 
 Found that companies provided a minimal 
approach to quantity of RM disclosure and much 
of it generalised statements of risk policy.   
 Company size associated with volume of RM 
disclosure.  
 Forward looking information is being released. 
Lajili & Zeghal 
(2005) 
Canadian Journal of 
Administrative sciences 
Canada Content Analysis, 
risk disclosure 
scores developed 
1999 Annual reports of 
TSE 300 listed 
Canadian companies 
 No theory. Prior literature 
discussed. 
 Content analysis: counted words in 
each risk related sentence and for each 
risk category.  
 Number of sentences and words were 
added together to calculate disclosure 
scores for firms and industries in the 
sample. 
 Risk information disclosed exclusively 
qualitative in nature and located in notes to 
accounts or management discussion and analysis 
section.  
 Most frequently cited risk categories were 
financial risk, commodity and market risk.  
 Large variation, particularly in voluntary risk 
reporting and much of the disclosures are quite 
limited in nature.  
Linsley & Shrives 
(2006) 
British Accounting 
Review 
UK Content analysis, 
statistical analysis 
of hypotheses 
2001 Full Annual reports 
of 79 UK listed 
companies 
 No theory. Prior literature 
discussed. 
 Concept of risk included 
credit risk, market risk, 
interest rate risk, 
operational risk and 
capital structure & 
adequacy. 
 Content analysis: Used number of 
sentences to determine extent of 
disclosure. 
 Specifically examining time 
orientation, whether they are 
monetarily quantified and if good or 
bad risk news is disclosed. 
 Considered hypothesis variables 
company size and level of risk to 
explain the extent of voluntary RM 
disclosure.  
 Found a total of 6168 risk disclosure sentences 
were identified within the same of annual 
reports. 
 Found a correlation between company size and 
environmental risk and volume of risk 
disclosure.   
 No correlation for other variables.   
 Monetary assessments uncommon, but forward 
looking information was observed. 
Linsley et al. (2006) Journal of Banking 
Regulation 
Canada & UK Content analysis, 
statistical testing 
2001 Annual reports of 
matched pairs of 9 
UK and Canadian 
banks 
 No theory. Prior literature 
discussed. 
 Content analysis-:counted RM 
sentences rather than words or pages.  
 Set of decision rules were created for 
consistent coding. Disclosure grid 
developed.  
 Tested hypotheses using statistical tests. 
 Overall dominance of general risk policy 
information indicates a risk information gap 
exists.  
 Quantitative and future risk information 
disclosed less than qualitative and past 
information.  
 
Abraham & Cox 
(2007) 
British Accounting 
Review 
UK companies in 
US 
Content analysis, 
disclosure index, 
regression 
analysis 
2002 Annual reports of 
FTSE 100 
(excluding financial 
companies) 
 
Narrative disclosures 
examined for 
business, financial 
and internal control 
risk 
 Agency theory  Content analysis - Sentences as the unit 
of analysis.  
 Scoring based on whether sentence 
includes risk information or not.  
 Disclosure index - sum of business, 
financial and internal control risk 
measures. 
 Measured relationship between risk 
disclosure levels and board of directors, 
institutional pension plans, dual-listed 
stock.  
 Examines narrative risk disclosure from a broad 
perspective.   
 Extends the analysis of risk reporting to examine 
the relationship between UK firms dual listed in 
the US.  
 Found that risk reporting is negatively related to 
share ownership by long-term institutions and 
that different types of board directors fulfil 
different functions as no. of executives and no. 
of independent directors are positively related to 
risk disclosure. 
Linsley & Lawrence 
(2007) 
Accounting, auditing and 
accountability journal 
UK  Content analysis  2001 Annual reports of 25 
largest non-financial 
companies listed in 
the FTSE 100  
 No theory.  Prior literature 
discussed. 
 Uses the Flesch Reading Ease formula 
to measure the readability of the risk 
disclosures. 
 Content analysis - authors 
independently identified risk-related 
sentences - sample of seven annual 
reports.  
 Creation of decision rules for the 
consistent coding of the remainder of 
the sample. 
 Found that no prior studies had focused on 
testing for readability of risk disclosures.  
 Identified that it is important that transparent risk 
information is provided to the marketplace. 
 This study is valuable in its examination of the 
clarity of communication of published risk 
information. 
42 
 
Authors Journal/Conference 
Where study 
conducted Method 
Period 
of 
Study Sample Theory applied Measurement Approach Main Results 
Beretta & Bozzolan 
(2008) 
Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing and Finance 
Italy Development of 
conceptual 
framework, 
content analysis 
 
2001 Annual reports of 85 
Non Financial Italian 
Listed companies 
 Development of 
conceptual framework is 
used as theory 
development and then 
conceptual framework 
tested 
 A new framework includes quantity of 
information disclosed and the richness 
of its content. 
 Richness defined as a function of width 
of the disclosures on different topics 
regarding a firm’s business model and 
value-creation strategy, and of the depth 
of the disclosures in relation to the 
presence insights into a firm’s future 
performance. 
 Tested validity of framework with 
sample companies using content 
analysis and statistics.  
 Explores idea that the quantity of disclosure is a 
sound proxy for the quality of disclosure.  
 Adopts a multidimensional framework and an 
index for quality disclosure is proposed.  
 Found that the proposed framework captures 
dimensions of annual report disclosure that are 
considered useful by financial analysts in 
forecasting earnings. 
 Stronger positive association between with 
accuracy & disclosure and a stronger negative 
association with the dispersion of financial 
analysts’ earnings forecasts than a simple index 
of disclosure quantity. 
Dobler (2008) International journal of 
accounting 
N/A Conceptual N/A N/A  Reviews models 
associated with risk 
management disclosures 
and presents a comparison 
of risk reporting 
requirements in US, IFRS 
and Germany 
 N/A  Reviews discretionary disclosure model on 
verified risk reporting including disclosure costs 
and uncertainty of information availability. 
 Reviews cheap talk models on unverified risk 
reporting such as the single-period cheap talk 
and multi-period cheap talk. 
 Found that incentives for risk reporting do not 
appear as prevalent as suggested in prior 
literature & provides reasons why risk reporting 
may not occur. 
 Presents a summary of regulatory requirements 
in US, IFRS and Germany. 
 Presents a short summary of risk reporting 
studies. 
Taylor et al. (2008) Asian Review of 
Accounting 
Australia Development of  
Financial 
Instrument 
disclosure index 
and Corporate 
governance 
composite score, 
Content analysis, 
statistical tests, 
regression 
analysis 
2005 Annual reports of 30 
Australian listed 
mining companies.  
No detail provided 
on whether all of 
annual report 
analysed or only a 
section. 
 Agency Theory  Development of a Financial Instrument 
Disclosure Index (FIDI) measuring 120 
financial instrument disclosure items in 
annual report disclosures. 
 Corporate governance composite score 
measures 13 corporate governance 
items.  
 Content analysis used to determine 
FIDI and CGS scores.  
 Regression analysis measured level of 
FIDI based on level of CGS. 
 Examined the relationship between corporate 
governance and managerial behaviour in the 
form of disclosures. 
 Developed a Financial instruments disclosure 
index and corporate governance scoring 
measurement. 
 Found a positive and significant relationship 
between corporate governance structure (CGS) 
and extent of financial instrument disclosures 
(FIDI). 
Amran et al. (2009) Managerial Auditing 
Journal 
Malaysia Content analysis 
and regression 
analysis 
2005 Narrative section of 
annual reports of 100 
Malaysian 
companies drawn 
from main and 
second board of 
Bursa Malaysia 
 Stakeholder theory  Content analysis - extent of risk 
disclosures (existence and types of risk 
disclosures). 
 Sum of the total number of sentences 
was used as the measure of risk 
disclosure. 
 Multiple regressions used to assess the 
variability of the extent of RM 
disclosures and the relationship 
between risk disclosures and the level 
of risk, size, industry & leverage.  
 Found the majority of companies studied did 
disclose risk information in the Chairman's 
statement in annual reports of Malaysian 
companies.  
 Found the number of sentences related to RM 
disclosure in annual reports of Malaysian 
companies was less than UK companies (Linsley 
& Shrives, 2006).  
 Size was significantly associated with level of 
risk disclosure. Leverage was not significant. 
Two out of eight industry variables were found 
significant at 5% level. 
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Brown et al. (2009) Corporate Governance- An 
international Review 
Australia Conceptual 
  
N/A  Discusses traditional 
corporate governance 
model, draws on 
corporate governance 
models and risk 
management models 
N/A  Role of the Audit committee (AC) in RM 
examined & compared to traditional role of the 
AC in overseeing financial and non-financial risk 
in complex risk environments.  
 Found the traditional governance mode in 
relation to the role of the AC being responsible 
for RM is inadequate for high technology 
companies who operate in a complex risk 
management environment.   
Hassan (2009) Managerial Auditing 
Journal 
UAE Development of 
RM disclosure 
index (CRD 
index), content 
analysis, 
regression 
analysis 
2005 Annual reports of 41 
companies listed on 
the Dubai Financial 
market or Abu Dabai 
Security Market 
 Positive accounting 
theory - economic 
consequences and 
institutional theory - 
social legitimacy 
 Development of a corporate risk 
disclosure index (CRD).  
 Grouped RM disclosures and scored 
disclosures based on risk information 
disclosed. 
 Regression analysis tested for 
associations between size, debt to 
equity, industry type, leverage, and 
reserves. 
 Investigates the relationship between the level of 
corporate risk disclosure and UAE corporation 
characteristics.. 
 Found support for the debt to equity and industry 
membership hypotheses. 
Othman & Ameer 
(2009) 
Journal of Financial 
Regulation and 
compliance 
Malaysia Content analysis 
and descriptive 
results 
2006 Annual reports of 
429 Main Board, 
Second board and 
MESDAQ 
companies  
 Financial Instrument 
Disclosure Requirements 
 Content Analysis used to code the 
disclosures into different risk categories 
and other characteristics 
 Study explores the market risk disclosure 
practices among Malaysian listed firms under 
FRS132 – Financial Instruments standard 
 Found that whilst the majority of companies 
complied, the extent of compliance varied. 
 Disclosure on various risks varied considerably. 
Cheung et al. (2010) Pacific Accounting 
Review 
Australia Interviews and 
questionnaires  
N/A Four leading 
accounting 
professors in 
Australian 
universities, a 
regulator and 
accounting 
professional body 
representative. 
 No theory.  Based on 
literature and accounting 
standards. 
 Reviews the literature on quality in 
relation to financial reporting in 
Australia. 
 Investigates how the qualitative 
characteristics of relevance, reliability, 
comparability and understandability 
developed in Australia and their 
relationship to financial reporting. 
 Investigates what is meant by "quality in relation 
to financial reporting. 
 Found that quality is related to 4 characteristics 
being relevance, reliability, comparability and 
understandability. 
 Identified that there are still unresolved issues in 
relation to how characteristics relate to financial 
reporting. 
Taylor et al. (2010) Accounting & Finance Australia Content analysis, 
RM disclosure 
index and 
composite score, 
regression 
analysis 
2002-
2006 
Sample of 111 Listed 
resource companies 
 Agency theory used as 
conceptual framework to 
examine RM disclosures 
 Content analysis coded to develop the 
financial risk management disclosure 
index (FRMD). 
 FRMDI score developed - sum of 27 
financial RM disclosure items.  
 Proxy measures for corporate 
governance structure developed from 
ASX corporate governance principles 
& recommendations.  
 Statistical testing and regression 
analysis used to test hypotheses. 
 Explored extent of RM disclosures and IFRS 
adoption of Financial instruments IFRS standard, 
the strength of corporate governance structures, 
the occurrence of capital raisings, listing in more 
than one jurisdiction and financial risk 
management disclosures (mandatory and 
discretionary).  
 Found that corporate governance and capital 
raisings of firms are significantly and positively 
associated with financial risk management 
disclosures in Australian resource companies. 
Dobler et al. (2011) Journal of international 
accounting research 
USA, Canada, UK 
and Germany 
Detailed content 
analysis, 
regression 
analysis to test 
hypotheses 
2005 Annual reports 
(notes to financial 
statements and 
management reports) 
of matched samples 
of 160 listed 
companies - 
manufacturing sector 
across the 4 
countries.  
 No theory.  Discussion of 
prior research and risk 
disclosure regulation. 
 Content analysis used sentences & 
more detailed than Linsley & Shrives 
(2006). 
 Selection of international and larger 
sample in one industry. 
 Includes location of RM disclosures, 
and type of reference to risk.   
 Regression analysis of relationship 
between risk disclosures and proxies 
for level of firm risk while controlling 
for firm size. 
 Conducted a detailed international analysis of 
corporate risk disclosure.  
 Found a consistent pattern of risk disclosures 
focused on the management report and on 
financial risk, with relatively less quantitative 
and forward-looking disclosures across all sub-
samples.   
 Regression results revealed a size effect and 
indicate that risk disclosure quantity is associated 
with level of firm risk. 
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Hemrit & Arab 
(2011) 
The Journal of Operational 
Risk 
Tunisia Content analysis 
and Risk 
disclosure index, 
statistical testing 
2000-
2009 
14 Tunisian 
insurance companies 
 Agency theory and 
information asymmetry 
 Disclosure index developed from 4 
conceptual elements of operational risk. 
 Coded using content analysis of risk 
disclosures. 
 Statistical tests of hypotheses. 
 Examines the disclosure practices related to 
operational risk in Tunisian insurance companies 
over a decade. 
 Provides a table of RM research.   
 Found that leverage and provisions intensity 
have a significant effect on operational risk 
reporting policy. 
 Size was related positively to the probability of 
disclosure. 
 Companies with low capital costs and large size 
were found to be more motivated to disclose the 
events of operational risk. 
Ismail & Rahman 
(2011) 
Journal of Corporate 
Governance 
Malaysia Content analysis, 
RM scored 
developed, 
regression 
analysis 
2006-
2008 
124 List companies 
on main board Bursa 
Malaysia 
 Agency theory  Content analysis used to code RM 
disclosures 
 RM score checklist developed to 
measure extent of RM disclosure based 
on disclosures related to 3 mandatory 
elements.   
 Three point scale used to measure 
extent.   
 Measurement of independent and 
control variables based on prior 
literature. 
 RM disclosure categorised into 2 main 
elements (mandatory and voluntary).  
 Examines the effects of institutional investors 
and board characteristics in monitoring RM 
disclosure level.  
 Disclosure has slightly increased from 2006 to 
2008.  
 Mandatory disclosure is 71%. Voluntary 
disclosure is around 50%. 
 Institutional investors were found to have a 
significant relation with level of RM disclosure.  
 Results are mixed on relationship between board 
of directors and RM disclosure levels. 
Oliveira et al. (2011a) Journal of Banking 
Regulation 
Portugal Content analysis 2006 Annual reports of 
190 Portuguese 
credit institutions 
(excluding financial 
institutions and 
credit institutions) 
No theory, prior research and 
regulation discussed. 
 Content analysis used to quantify the 
risk related quantitative information 
and narrative information disclosed in 
annual reports.  
 Coded to 6 risk disclosure categories. 
 The adoption of IFRS has bought greater flow of 
risk related information but not increased 
transparency.  
 Found that risk related disclosures lacked 
comparability because of different maturity time 
bands and different reporting practices for capital 
structure and adequacy.  
 Misalignment of quantitative disclosures and 
related narrative disclosures led to problems of 
relevance, reliability and understandability  
Oliveira et al (2011b) Journal of Financial 
Regulation and 
compliance 
Portugal Content Analysis 2006  Annual reports of 
111 banks. 
 Institutional theory 
 Legitimacy theory, 
 Resource based theory 
 Content analysis of entire annual report 
using sentences as unit of analysis - 
assess voluntary operation risk and 
capital structure and adequacy 
disclosures based on disclosure 
categories from the 3rd Pillar of Basel 
II accord.  
 Economic sign of disclosure coded 
(monetary/non-monetary) and type of 
measure (past/future).  
 Explores the factors that affected the voluntary 
risk related disclosures (RRD) in individual 
annual reports of Portuguese banks.  
 Found low levels of RRD - mean of 16.78 
sentences.  
 Also identified that narratives difficult to read 
and failure of narratives to explain numerical 
disclosures.  
 Highest level of disclosures by large listed banks 
consistent with theory. 
Taylor & Zhang 
(2011) 
AFAANZ Conference Australia  Content analysis 
and regression 
analysis 
 2009  Annual reports of  
66 companies in Top 
201-Top 350 listed 
ASX companies 
 Agency Theory  Content analysis - Sentences the unit of 
analysis to assess RM disclosures. 
 Considered impact of Institutional 
investors, audit committees on RM 
disclosure levels. 
 Found that long-term institutional ownership was 
negatively and weakly related to RM disclosure 
levels. 
 Positive association between audit committee 
independence and RM disclosure levels. 
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Abraham et al. (2012) Institute of Chartered 
Accountants Scotland 
UK Interviews, 
content analysis 
2009-
2010 
32 analysts &,16 
preparer interviews 
with representatives 
of 16 FTSE-listed 
companies 
representing FTSE 
100, 250 and AIM 
Markets 
 
Annual reports of 18 
food and beverage 
companies 
 No theory.  Prior literature 
discussed. 
 32 Interviews covered 3 broad themes: 
sources of RM information, impact of 
regulation on RM disclosures and types 
of RM disclosed and constraints on 
disclosure. 
 Content analysis of 18 annual reports of 
companies in food and beverages sector 
of financial times share service. 
 Identified that analysts found one to one 
meetings are the most useful source of RM 
information.  
 Mixed views about the usefulness of RM 
disclosures in the annual reports, with some 
analysts considering them to be useful while 
others see them as too general or boilerplate.  
 RM disclosures have increased but concern over 
emphasis on quantity rather than quality. 
Elzahar & Hussainey 
(2012) 
Journal of risk finance UK  Content analysis 
& regression 
analysis 
2009-
2010 
Interim report 
narrative sections of 
72 UK  companies 
 Agency theory 
 Signaling theory 
 Content analysis - risk related sentences 
used to measure level of risk 
information in interim reports.  
 Regression considered impact of firm 
characteristics - sector type, firm size, 
cross listing, profitability, liquidity, 
gearing, institutional ownership, board 
size, role duality, board composition, 
AC size on level of risk disclosures. 
 Used agency and signaling theory to identify 
potential drivers of risk information in interim 
company reports. 
 Found that company size, type of business is 
positively associated with RMD.  Other 
characteristics insignificant. 
Aebi et al. (2012) Journal of banking and 
finance 
North America Statistical analysis 2006 Annual reports and 
proxy statements 
forms of 573 US 
banks 
 No theory, prior literature 
discussed 
 Collected data on RM & Chief Risk 
Officer (CRO) and board members, 
dedicated bank risk committee, board 
independence, board size, percentage of 
directors with experience as an 
executive officer in a bank or insurance 
company.  
 Five further variables related to the risk 
committee, 10 corporate governance 
variables and 3 measures of bank 
performance were collected. 
 Considers whether RM disclosure related to 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
 Found that where the CRO reports to the board, 
the bank performed significantly better in 
financial crisis than other banks in the sample. 
 Other variables were not significantly associated 
with bank performance. 
Miihkinen (2012) International journal of 
accounting 
Finland Content analysis, 
developed a 
composite model 
of the overall 
quality of risk 
disclosure 
2005-
2006 
129 listed companies 
at OMX Helsinki 
 No theory, prior literature 
discussed 
 Define risk disclosure - all information 
firms provide in the risk reviews they 
present in their annual reports.  
 Includes both historical and forward 
looking information.  
 Content analysis based on number of 
risk disclosure words. 
 Used to assess RM disclosures against 
the Risk disclosure standard of the 
Finnish Accounting Practice Board. 
 Examines the impact of a detailed national 
disclosure standard on the quality of companies 
overall risk reviews under IFRS.   
 Considers quality for risk disclosure by applying 
disclosure quality indicate from Beattie (2004) 
and Beretta & Bozzolan (2004).  The results 
demonstrate that the risk disclosure standard 
resulted in improved quality of risk disclosure 
across several dimensions. 
Elshandidy et al. 
(2013) 
International review of 
Financial Analysis 
UK Content analysis, 
score development 
& regression 
analysis 
2005-
2009 
Annual reports of 
339 UK listed 
companies 
 Disclosure theory and 
prior research 
 Automated content analysis - used 
sentences to measure three levels of 
risk disclosure (aggregated, voluntary 
and mandatory).  
 Count of risk statements in whole 
annual report rather than restricting to 
specific sections used).  
 Used Nvivo to search for risk related 
keywords and all statements including 
at least one keyword are counted. 
 Investigates how firm risk levels impact 
aggregated, voluntary and mandatory risk 
disclosures in UK companies.  
 Found that aggregated and voluntary risk 
disclosures are positively associated with 
systematic and financing risk and risk-adjusted 
returns.  
 Mandatory risk disclosures influenced by other 
firms and corporate governance characteristics 
than firm's risk levels. 
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Ismail et al. (2013) Journal of applied 
Business Research 
Malaysia Content analysis 2006-
2009 
Annual reports of 17 
Islam Banks 
 No theory, prior literature 
discussed 
 Content Analysis - three point scale to 
determine extent of RM disclosure. 
 Overall result for mandatory disclosure was 
89%.  Voluntary disclosure varied from 87-86% 
dependent on type of risk.  Highest was RM 
framework disclosure. 
Mokhtar & Mellett 
(2013) 
Managerial Auditing 
Journal 
Egypt Content analysis 
and unweighted 
disclosure index 
developed, 
statistical analysis 
2007 Annual reports of 
105 listed 
companies- stratified 
random sample 
 Proprietary costs theory 
 Agency theory,  
 Stakeholder theory 
 Political cost theory 
 signaling theory  
 Legitimacy theory 
 Content analysis used to code 
disclosures to measure the level of 
compliance with mandatory risk 
disclosure standard.   
 Sentences is the unit of analysis used.   
 Sentences codes according to nature of 
evidence, type of news, outlook and 
type of risk. 
 Unweighted disclosure index developed 
from coding. 
 Explores the extent of mandatory and voluntary 
risk reporting and the impact of competition, 
corporate governance and ownership structure. 
 The average level of compliance is 21.57% and 
ranged from 5-71%.This implies the cost of 
compliance exceeds the cost of non-compliance.  
 Found little voluntary reporting, more qualitative 
compared to quantitative risk reporting, good 
news and non-financial reported. RM disclosures 
tended to be backward looking compared to 
forward looking.  
 Significant positive associated between board 
size and risk. 
Probohudono et al. 
(2013) 
Social Responsibility 
Journal 
South East Asia Content analysis 
and development 
of a Risk 
disclosure index, 
regression 
analysis 
2007-
2009 
Annual reports of 60 
listed Manufacturing 
companies in 
Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore & 
Australia 
 Agency theory  Content analysis used to code risk 
disclosures.   
 Dichotomous scored 1 or 0.   
 Risk disclosure index developed from 
scoring, regression analysis assess 
determinants of risk disclosures.   
 Found that the disclosure of risk data is relatively 
consistent across the three years at 26-29%.  
 Low level of risk disclosure.   
 Country, size and board independence were 
found to be positively significantly associated 
with level of risk disclosure. 
 Leverage is negatively associated with the extent 
of voluntary risk disclosure. 
Abraham & Shrives 
(2014) 
British Accounting 
Review 
UK  Content analysis 2002-
2007 
Annual reports of 
FTSE 100 - 2008 
(Food Producers and 
Processors Sector) 
 Proprietary costs theory  
 Institutional theory 
 Content analysis to identify risk factors 
in annual reports. 
 Moves away from counting words & 
sentences. 
 Divided risk statements into general 
and company specific and analysed for 
meaning. 
 Longitudinal study of quality of RM disclosures 
which develops multi-theoretic framework,  
 Found that RM disclosures tend to be quite 
general and routine, follow prior disclosures 
closely, often boiler plate. 
 Companies do not appear to signal good RM 
through comprehensive disclosures and appear to 
prefer general non-specific routine information.  
Tao & Hutchinson 
(2013) 
Journal of Contemporary 
Accounting and 
Economics 
Australia Regression 
analysis 
2006-
2008 
Unbalanced panel 
data set of 317 ASX 
listed companies in 
the financial sector 
 Agency theory  Regression analysis with 2 dependent 
variables - Risk measured by Beta and 
Firm performance measured by 
Earnings per share. 
 Independent variables – risk committee 
and compensation committee 
characteristics. 
 Examines the role of compensation and risk 
committees in managing and monitoring the risk 
behaviour of Australian firms in the lead up to 
the global financial crisis.   
 Composition of the risk and compensation 
committees is positively associated with risk, 
which in turn is associated with firm 
performance. 
Al-Najjar & Abed 
(2014) 
Managerial Auditing 
Journal 
UK  Content analysis 
and regression 
analysis 
2006 Narrative sections of 
Annual reports of 
238 UK companies 
listed on London 
Stock Exchange 
 Agency Theory options  
 optimal contract  
 existence of independence 
directors,  
 undertaking internal & 
external audits,  
 increase level of 
information disclosed by 
companies 
 Hypothesized that corporate disclosure 
associated with board independence, 
AC, independence, blockholding 
ownership and CEO turnover. 
 Used key word search to identify 
forward looking information.  Scoring 
based on Abed & Roberts (2011).  
 Regression analysis used to assess 
hypotheses. 
 Found that the independence of AC and 
blockholder ownership are associated with level of 
voluntary disclosure of Forward Looking 
information.   
 Corporate disclosure is significantly related to 
company size, performance, cross listing and 
operating cash flow. 
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Authors Journal/Conference 
Where study 
conducted Method 
Period 
of 
Study Sample Theory applied Measurement Approach Main Results 
Elshandidy & Neri 
(2014) 
Corporate Governance- An 
international Review 
UK and Italy Content analysis 
and score 
development 
2005-
2010 
290 UK and 88 
italian non-financial 
companies 
 Agency theory  
 Stewardship theory 
 Automated content analysis to capture 
risk disclosure scores. 
 Developed a list of key words and 
generated aggregate risk disclosure 
scores for each country by counting the 
frequency of sentences containing at 
least one of these risk words.   
 Developed measures for voluntary and 
mandatory risk disclosure levels. 
 Considers influence of corporate governance on 
mandatory and voluntary risk disclosures in UK 
and Italy. 
 Found corporate governance significantly 
motivates UK firms to higher levels of voluntary 
than mandatory risk disclosures in narrative 
sections of their annual reports. 
 In contrast, corporate governance in Italy 
motivates companies to provide more mandatory 
risk disclosures than voluntary. 
Elshandidy et al. 
(2014) 
The British Accounting 
Review 
Germany, UK and 
US 
Content analysis, 
score development 
and regression 
analysis 
2005-
2010 
219 German, 339 
UK and 320 US 
listed companies 
 Institutional theory  Content analysis used via Nvivo to 
measure both mandatory and voluntary 
risk disclosures.  
 Risk related keywords used to code 
data.   
 All statements including a risk related 
word counted. 
  A disclosure score developed for 
mandatory disclosure. 
 Investigates how firm and country characteristics 
explain variations in mandatory and voluntary risk 
reporting both within and between non- financial 
firms across Germany, UK and US. 
 Germany focused on mandatory, UK is focused on 
voluntary and US is a combination of the two 
approaches.  
 Found significant variations in mandatory and 
voluntary risk reporting between firms across the 3 
countries. 
Maffei et al. (2014) Managerial Auditing 
Journal 
Italy Content analysis 2011 Notes to the 
Financial Statements 
and Annual reports 
of 66 Italian Banks 
 Regulation used as theory  Content analysis used to investigate the 
variation in the level of RM disclosure 
between notes to financial statements 
and public reports.   
 Italian Banks formally comply with the Bank of 
Italy's instructions but option to choose information 
which affects the quantity of RM disclosure in each 
report and for each risk category. 
Sekome and Lemma 
(2014) 
Managerial Auditing 
Journal 
South Africa Content analysis 
and regression 
analysis 
  Annual reports of 
181 non-financial 
listed companies on 
Johannesburg 
Securities Exchange 
 Multi-theoretic approach 
including Agency, 
corporate legitimacy 
theory, signaling and 
institutional theory 
 Content analysis used to assess the 
extent of disclosures. 
 Regression analysis applied to assess 
the determinants of risk disclosure. 
 Strong positive relationship between the separate 
RM Committee and board independence, board 
size, firm size and industry type.  
 No support for independent board chair, auditor 
reputation, reporting risk and financial leverage. 
 
 
